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Executive Summary
English
This work describes the development of a radiometric mobile inspection system
called SMANDRA (the Italian acronym stands for Sistema Mobile per Analisi Non
Distruttive e RAdiometriche). SMANDRA is part of a large project called SLIMPORT,
financed by the Italian Ministry for the Economic Development (MISE), dedicated
to the development of an integrated toolbox forming a complete security system
to monitor the flow of persons and merchandise in harbors. The system has been
conceived as a flexible and transportable tool, to be used in conjunction with fixed
installation such as radiation portal monitors, x-ray scanners and large detector
arrays. In particular, the aims of SMANDRA are to detect and identify sources
of ionizing radiation or identify dangerous and/or illegal materials inside volumes
previously tagged as ”suspect” by conventional X-ray scanners. The whole detec-
tor apparatus was designed minimizing volume and weight to be easily movable,
mounted over forklifts or other light vehicles for inspections. In addition, it is pos-
sible to operate the entire system with batteries, making it completely independent
from external power facilities. The system is made of two pieces having a volume
less than 0.1 m3 as follows:
• A passive unit including two gamma-ray detectors (5”x5” NaI(Tl) and 2”x2”
LaBr3(Ce)) and two neutron counters (5”x2” liquid scintillator NE-213 and
3He proportional counter for fast and slow neutrons). The unit hosts batteries,
power supplies, front-end electronics and CPU.
• An active unit including a portable sealed neutron generator based on the
Tagged Neutron Inspection System (TNIS) technique.
The first unit can be used in standalone mode as a high efficiency spectroscopic ra-
diometer for the detection of ionizing radiation such as gamma-rays, fast and thermal
neutrons to search and identify radioactive material as well as Special Nuclear Ma-
terial (SNM). It can also be used as detector package connected to the second unit
for active interrogation of voxels inside a load by tagged neutron inelastic scattering
imaging. All detector used in the SMANDRA system have been fully character-
ized. Initial tests were done with traditional analog NIM electronics followed by the
new digital electronics based on fast digitizers. The detection and identification of
standard radioactive sources (gamma ray and neutrons) has been tested successfully
showing detection probability in order or even better with the requirements of this
type of instrumentation. The detection of special nuclear material has been tested
using SMANDRA as a high sensitivity passive spectroscopic system or as a complete
active inspection system using tagged neutrons. The detection of plutonium samples
seems to be possible with passive interrogation even in case of small samples (few
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grams) due to the yield of gamma ray and neutrons. As it is well known, detection
of uranium samples poses more problems because of the low neutron yield that char-
acterizes this material. The gamma ray yield of highly enriched U samples could be
easily shielded. In this case active interrogation is needed. Results show that it is
possible to provide signature for the discrimination of uranium against heavy metals
(as lead) by looking to the absolute gamma and neutron yield in coincidence with
tagged neutrons or to correlations between detectors. It is worth mentioning that
the SMANDRA system is a mobile multi-purpose spectrometric system not specifi-
cally designed to detect SNM. However the results reported might be implemented
in future portable systems specifically designed to detect SNM in active mode.
Italiano
Questo lavoro descrive lo sviluppo di un sistema mobile per ispezioni radiometriche,
chiamato SMANDRA (Sistema Mobile per Analisi Non Distruttive e Radiomet-
riche). SMANDRA fa parte di un grande progetto chiamato SLIMPORT, finanziato
dal Ministero Italiano dello sviluppo Economico (MISE), rivolto allo sviluppo di un
sistema di sicurezza integrato per il monitoraggio del flusso di persone e merci nei
porti. Il sistema e` stato progettato come uno strumento mobile e flessibile, da us-
are in combinazione con postazioni fisse come portali, scanners x-ray e grandi array
di rivelatori. Piu` in particolare, lo scopo di SMANDRA e` quello di identificare sor-
genti radioattive e materiali illegali e/o pericolosi nascosti dentro container e bagagli
segnalati come “sospetti” dai sistemi di sicurezza tradizionali. L’intero apparato e`
stato disegnato per minimizzare il volume ed il peso in modo da essere facilmente
trasportabile su un muletto o su altri veicoli leggeri per ispezioni mirate. In aggiunta
il sistema puo` essere alimentato a batterie, rendendolo completamente indipendente
dall’allacciamento elettrico. Il sistema e` composto di due unita` che hanno un volume
totale minore di 0.1 m3:
• Un’unita` passiva composta da due rivelatori di raggi gamma (5”x5” NaI(Tl)
e 2”x2” LaBr3(Ce)) e due rivelatori di neutroni (scintillatore liquido NE-213
da 5”x2” e un contatore proporzionale ad 3He). L’unita` contiene le batterie,
l’alimentazione, l’elettronica digitale e la CPU per l’acquisizione ed analisi
dati.
• Un’unita` passiva che include un generatore portatile di neutroni per l’identificazione
dei materiali illeciti e/o pericolosi tramite la tecnica TNIS (Tagged Neutron
Inspection System).
La prima unita` puo` essere usata da sola come un radiometro spettroscopico ad alta
efficienza per la rivelazione di radiazioni ionizzanti come raggi-gamma, neutroni ve-
loci e neutroni termici e per identificare materiale radioattivo come ad esempio il
Materiale Speciale Nucleare (SNM). Questa unita` e` poi usata insieme al generatore
di neutroni per interrogazioni attive di specifiche porzioni di volume all’interno di
container, grazie alla tecnica TNIS. Tutti i rivelatori di SMANDRA sono stati to-
talmente caratterizzati: i test iniziali sono stati fatti con elettronica analogica NIM
seguiti da quelli effettuati con la nuova elettronica digitale basata su digitizer ve-
loci. E` stata dimostrata la possibilita` di rivelare e identificare le sorgenti radioattive
standard (raggi-gamma e neutroni) con un livello di confidenza migliore di quello
richiesta dallo standard per questo tipo di strumentazione. La rivelazione di ma-
teriale speciale nucleare e` stata testata sia in modalita` passiva con la prima unita`
vsia in modalita` attiva usando il generatore di neutroni. Il riconoscimento di un
campione di plutonio e` possibile con la sola interrogazione passiva anche in caso di
campioni molto piccoli (qualche grammo) grazie all’alta emissione di raggi-gamma e
neutroni. Come e` noto, invece, la rivelazione di campioni di Uranio e` piu` difficoltosa
vista la bassa emissione di neutroni e la possibilita` di schermare facilmente i pochi
raggi-gamma; in questo caso e` necessario intervenire con un’interrogazione attiva.
I risultati dimostrano la possibilita` di discriminare fra campioni di Uranio rispetto
a metalli pesanti (come il piombo) guardando i conteggi assoluti di raggi-gamma e
neutroni in coincidenza con l’emissione di un neutrone da parte del generatore o, in
alternativa, guardando alla correlazione degli eventi fra due rivelatori (NaI(Tl) e NE-
213). E` importante sottolineare che SMANDRA e` un sistema spettrometrico mobile
multi-funzione, non disegnato specificamente per la rivelazione di materiale speciale
nucleare. Tuttavia i risultati mostrano la possibilita` in futuro di poter implementare
sistemi portatili disegnati specificatamente per l’identificazione di Materiale Speciale
Nucleare con l’ausilio di un generatore di neutroni.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays, the construction of a nuclear weapon does not pose strong technical
problem, since the baisc know-how has been in the public domain for several decades
[1]. The only barrier preventing a terrorist group from performing a nuclear attack
is the difficulty to access to a sufficient amount of special nuclear material (SNM)
as highly enriched weapon-graded uranium (WGU) or weapon-graded plutonium
(WGP), as defined in the next section.
Stockpiles of SNM should be stored in high-security facilities, but the “nuclear
club” of nations who possess nuclear technologies and materials has widened com-
pared to Cold War years, and a black market of procurement networks is being
formed [2]. In such situation, the second line of defense will be the ability to detect
special nuclear material (SMN) while in transit through the civilian transportation
infrastructure.
U.S. homeland security experts say that terrorist threats are most likely to enter
our nation by way of the sea, in one of the nearly seven million cargo containers
offloaded at U.S. ports every year. These tractor-trailer-sized, steel-walled boxes are
typically sealed in foreign ports and not opened until delivered by trucks to points
all across the country. Despite heightened security concerns following the September
11 terrorist attacks, less than two percent of these containers have been in past years
inspected at U.S. seaports, according to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
agency.
Today’s approach to nuclear detection relies primarily on fixed inspection portals
placed at the national borders (the so-called port-of-entry) or in other transportation
nodes; while their presence still represents an advancement in security procedures,
doubts have been rised about the possibility that highly shielded or masked SNM
might not be detected by those portals. A real improvement would be reaching the
capability to detect nuclear materials with improved detection systems anywhere
within the transportation infrastructure; that would deter nuclear terrorist attempt-
ing to pursue construction and deployment of a nuclear weapon. Hence, last years
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have seen a large extension of research projects in the field of mobile instruments,
to which this work belongs.
1.1 Definition of the problem
The following items are considered to be radiological/nuclear1 threats:
1. operative nuclear weapons;
2. improvised Nuclear Devices (IND);
3. special Nuclear Material (SNM) that might be used to realize an IND;
4. radioactive material to be used inside Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD).
Radioactive isotopes in each of the four classes emit gamma radiation. Neutron
radiation may be emitted too, but not necessarily in substantial quantities. An
RDD may contain radiological material emitting no neutron radiation at all, some
uranium isotopes emit negligible amounts of neutron radiation. On the contrary
most plutonium isotopes are known to be strong neutron sources.
Detectable signatures of RDD components
Generally speaking, RDD components (item 4 above) present no detection problems,
even if shielded. Indeed, in order to have a significant contamination potential, the
activity of a Radiological Dispersive Device is expected to be at the 1 MBq level.
Detectable signatures of SNM
SNM (items 1-3 above) may present non trivial detection problems. The most known
Special Nuclear Material are the following:
• Weapons Grade Uranium (WGU), typically having a composition similar to
the following:
234U 1%, 235U 93%, 238U 6%
The IAEA defines 25 kg of WGU as a “significant quantity”
• Weapons Grade Plutonium (WGPu), typically having a composition similar
to the following:
239Pu 93%, 240Pu 6%.
1The nomenclature “radiological” refers to any radioactive material usable for radiological ter-
rorism including RDDs (“dirty bombs”). “Nuclear” refers specifically to neutron emitting materials,
i.e. transuranic actinides such as uranium and plutonium isotopes.
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The IAEA defines 8 kg of WGPu as a “significant quantity”.
Besides depending on the SNM composition and quantity, a nuclear device’s
radiation emission also depends on further factors such as geometry and tamper
material.
A schematic diagram of an implosion bomb is illustrated in Fig. 1.1, where the
radioactive core is surrounded by a first shell of 2 cm Beryllium acting as reflector
and a second shell of 3 cm Tungsten or depleted Uranium acting as tamper material.
The tamper material has an influence on the emitted radiation rate, as can be seen
in Table 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Weapon model used for signature estimation
WGU WGPu
Tamper mat. n rate (n/s) γ rate (γ/s) n rate (n/s) γ rate (γ/s)
Tungsten ∼30 ∼30 ∼ 4 · 105 ∼ 103
Depleted U ∼1400 ∼ 105 ∼ 4 · 105 ∼ 105
Table 1.1: Tamper material influence on the emitted radiation rate
Unless a genuine spectrometric capability is implemented, the gamma ray spec-
trum from WGU and WGPu can easily be masked by radioactive substances of
common use in industry and by Natural Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM).
Irrespective of the high gamma ray flux, the detection of WGU and WGPu is of-
ten driven by neutron detection, essentially because natural neutron backgrounds are
typically 3 orders of magnitude lower than natural gamma background. Moreover,
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the majority (>95%) of all neutrons emitted by SNM are so-called fast neutrons,
with energies above the keV region. The possibility to distinguish fast from ther-
mal neutrons offers the possibility to enhance the discrimination against natural
background sources: this issue will be exploited in this work.
Neutron radiation signature
Neutron emission from the core material, including spontaneous fission and alpha
particle induced neutron emission, is about 20 and 2 · 105 neutrons/second for the
12 kg and 4 kg of WGU and WGPu respectively. This is the characteristic neutron
emission from bulk SNM. In case of an IND (see Fig. 1.1), the neutron yield also
depends on the type of tamper material. If the device uses 12 kg of WGU and
tungsten then the total emission at surface is about 30 neutrons/second. If the
device uses Depleted Uranium then the emission is about 1400 neutron/second, due
to neutron multiplication in these materials. Neutron emission remains very high in
the case of WGPu devices for both tamper materials (about 4 ·105 neutron/second).
Natural neutron backgrounds are typically three orders of magnitude lower than
natural gamma backgrounds.
The majority (>95%) of all neutrons emitted by SNM are fast neutrons. Shield-
ing generally has a thickness-dependent effect on the fast neutron component. Fig.
1.2 shows the shielding dependence of the fast neutron fraction within the total
neutron signature.
Gamma radiation signature
Neutron emission is accompanied by an important yield of gamma rays. As shown
in [3], most of the isotopes of interest emit on average 6.5 gamma rays of 1 MeV
energy (per fission). The use of DU tamper entails an emission of 105 gamma/second
for both WG material. This value decreases with tungsten tampers that act as a
gamma-ray shield. In this case the emission reaches 30 gamma/second for WGU
and 100 gamma/second for WGPu
Some characteristic gamma-rays are often used to identify relevant isotope. For
example, 235U is normally identified by looking at the 186 keV transition. However,
it has been reported that such low-energy lines are easily shielded or even masked
by other radioactive substances of common use in industry (such as 137Cs), thus
making the identification of 235U by only its gamma-ray signature difficult.
Signature strengths relative to background
The detection of WGPu is generally based on neutron emission. More difficult is the
detection of WGU, especially when tungsten rather than DU tampers are utilized.
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Figure 1.2: Plot showing the effect of shielding on the fraction of fast neutrons escaping an IND
device described above based on simulations using GEANT4 [?]
When searching for neutrons as the signature of SNM, the background due
to neutrons produced in the interaction of cosmic rays at sea level is about 10−2
neutrons/second/cm2, increasing significantly with altitude. It is worth noting that
natural background is four times lower than that induced by the test 252Cf source in
the IEC 62244 standard. Moreover, the neutron background seen by a fast neutron
detector is two orders of magnitude higher than that seen by a thermal neutron
detector.
In such background conditions and with a hypothetical neutron detector with
25% efficiency and 10 cm diameter, it is quite easy to detect the strong neutron
yield from WGPu even at large stand-off distances (several meters), whereas the
detection of WGU is more difficult, especially when the tungsten tamper is used. In
the later case it is only possible do detect the neutron yield at very close distance
(at contact).
1.2 International standards
IEC (International Electrotecnical Commission) defined a set of standard for detec-
tion systems dedicated to the monitor of ionizing radiations in various scenery. Two
of them are of particular interest to this project:
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a) IEC62244, Radiation protection instrumentation - Installed radiation monitors
for the detectio nof radioactive and special nuclear materials at national borders
b) IEC 62327, Hand-held instruments for the detection and identification of radionu-
clides and additionally for the indication of ambient dose equivalent rate from
photon radiation
The main difference between the two standards is that hand-held devices are
required to detect not only the presence of a radiation source, but also to be able to
identify it. Briefly, IEC IEC62327 rules require:
• in case of gamma rays, to launch an alarm within 3 seconds if radiation levels
exceed threshold, and to identify the source in 1-2 minutes for a dose rate of
500 nSv/h on the detector
• as of the neutrons, to get an alarm in 10 seconds in presence of a 252Cf source
producing a neutronic dose of 3 microSv/h on the detector (corresponding to
a source emitting 2 · 104 neutrons/s placed at a distance of 25 cm)
Another technical guidance is prepared by IAEA. The document is addressed to
all instruments used by FLOs (Front Line Officers) and experts. We are interested
in particular to RIDs (Radionuclide Identification devices), NSDs (neutron search
devices) hand-held systems and Portable radiation scanners (PRSs). The common
requirements for these systems are:
• False Alarm Rate (FAR) for either gamma rays or neutrons during operation
shall not be more than one per hour.
• Probability of detection of 90% with a condifence level of 95%
• Detection of radioactive material that produces a dose rate of 0.05µSv/h in
the point of closest approach to the instrument and moves with a speed of 0.5
m/s.
• Detection of γ-ray in the energy range from 50 keV to 1.33 MeV.
SMANDRA meets or overcomes all of these requirements; details on the tests
are presented in Sec. 5.
1.3 SMANDRA - General description
The SLIMPORT project [4], financed by the Italian Ministry for the Economic De-
velopment (MISE), has been dedicated to the development of an integrated toolbox
forming a complete security system to monitor the flow of persons and merchandise
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in harbors. In this framework, a mobile inspection station (called SMANDRA, the
Italian acronym stands for Sistema Mobile per Analisi Non Distruttive e RAdio-
metriche) has been developed. The system has been conceived as a flexible and
transportable tool, usable in conjunction with fixed installation such as radiation
portal monitors, x-ray scanners and large detector arrays. In particular, the aims
of SMANDRA are to detect and identify sources of ionizing radiation or identify
dangerous and/or illegal materials inside volumes previously tagged as suspect by
conventional X-ray scanners. The whole detector apparatus was designed minimiz-
ing volume and weight to be easily movable, mounted over forklifts or other light
vehicles for inspections. In addition, it is possible to operate the entire system with
batteries, making it completely independent from external power facilities.
In figure 1.3 the complete system is shown during a laboratory test campaign.
The system is made of two pieces having a volume less than 0.1 m3 as follows:
Figure 1.3: SMANDRA during laboratory test
• A passive unit including two gamma-ray detectors (5”x 5” NaI(Tl) and 2”x
2” LaBr3(Ce)) and two neutron counters (5”x 2” liquid scintillator and
3He
proportional counter for fast and slow neutrons). The unit hosts batteries,
power supplies, front-end electronics and CPU
• An active unit including a portable sealed neutron generator based on the
Tagged Neutron Inspection System (TNIS) technique [5].
The first unit can be used in standalone mode as a high efficiency spectroscopic ra-
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diometer for the detection of ionizing radiation such as gamma-rays, fast and thermal
neutrons to search and identify radioactive material as well as Special Nuclear Ma-
terial (SNM). It can also be used as detector package connected to the second unit
for active interrogation of voxels inside a load by tagged neutron inelastic scattering
imaging.
The double use of SMANDRA (active and passive interrogations) sets stringent
requirements for the detector choice:
• low background and high efficiency detectors for the identification of weak
radioactive sources
• capability of discriminating the two components of the radiation (neutrons
and gamma rays) in the passive mode. This is an important feature for the
identification of special nuclear material (SNM) sources
• high count rate capability to operate in coincidence with the associated particle
counter hosted in the neutron generator.
1.3.1 Passive unit
The internal structure of the passive unit is shown in figure 1.4 and a summary of
SMANDRA detectors is reported in table 1.2.
Figure 1.4: Internal structure of SMANDRA passive unit
1.3. SMANDRA - GENERAL DESCRIPTION 9
Detector Particle Usage
NaI(Tl) γ Spectroscopy (low backgr. high eff.)
LaBr3(Ce) γ Spectroscopy (high resolution)
NE-213 γ, n n-γ discrimination
3He n n threshold alarms
Table 1.2: Summary of SMANDRA detectors
Photon spectroscopy is performed using a high resolution 2”x 2” BrilLanCeTM
380 LaBr3(Ce) detector and a high efficiency large volume 5”x 5” NaI(Tl) scintillator.
The LaBr3(Ce) detector offers the ultimate energy resolution for scintillators [6]
but it shows some weaknesses. It is presently available only with modest volumes
compared to other scintillators, therefore this represents limitation for energetic
gamma rays (up to 6 MeV) [7] from inelastic excitation in the active interrogations.
Furthemore LaBr3(Ce) suffers from internal activity [8] with some problem in the
identification of weak γ sources.
A large NaI(Tl) scintillator has been selected to be used as detector for energetic
gamma rays in active investigations as well as high efficiency device in the detection
and identification of weak gamma sources with a simple decay scheme, when the
energy resolution is not playing an important role.
In this application the scintillation detectors are more advisable respect to semi-
conductor (like HPGe or CzT) that exibits a much better energy resolution but
limited efficiency. The important features of this prototype are flexiblility and
trasportability and the use of semiconductors implies the presence of a reservoir
of liquid nitrogen or a limitation in autonomy due to the power consumption of
mechanical cryosystems.
Table 1.3 shows a short summary of detector performances.
Detector NaI(Tl) 5”x 5” LaBr3(Ce) 2”x 2”
Full Energy Efficiency (@4.4 MeV) 0.24 0.25
Peak/Compton ratio 0.55 0.8
Factor of Merit (FM)* 31 5
Time resolution (typical) 2-3 ns < 1 ns
Space resolution (in AP systems) 10-15 cm < 5 cm
Energy resolution (@661 keV) 7-8% < 3.5%
Cost 5-6 kEuro 15 kEuro
*FM is the product of full energy efficiency times the surface of the detector
Table 1.3: Performance comparison for SMANDRA gamma detectors
Neutron detection is perfomed with a typical organic liquid scintillator (5”x 2”
type NE-213) and an ASPECT SN-01 3He proportional counter. The ability of
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detecting fast neutrons becomes relevant in presence of unshielded SNM sources, for
this reason a liquid scintillator coupled with a fast PMT tube is the best choice.
In this case, the Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD) [9] technique will be applied
to discriminate neutrons from gamma rays. The interest in the detection of fast
neutrons is motivated also by the energy dependence of the neutron background [10],
as shown in figure 1.5, so that the signal-to-noise ratio is optimized.
Figure 1.5: Plot of neutron background energy differential flux derived from [11].
The 3He proportional counter with a polyethylene moderator is a typical choice
as neutron counter for systems operated in passive mode [12]. This kind of detector
is sensible only to thermal neutrons so the function of moderator is to make nearly
costant the efficiency of the detector over the entire neutron energy range.
Finally, another important distinctive fact of SMANDRA is the simple electronic
front-end based on fast digitizer. The passive unit hosts a prototype VME mini-crate
(4 slots) with battery power supply for a complete autonomy of the system. The
mini-crate can be configured with the V1718 USB Bridge module. In the minicrate
there are also a programmable HV power supply V6533 (6 Ch, 4 kV, 3 mA, 9W)
and a fast digitizer V1720 (8 Ch, 12 bit, 250 MS/s). Inside the V1720 4 FPGA (1
FPGA for a couple of channels) are used to implement the Digital Pulse Processing
(DPP) algorithms, providing online for each event a reference time, a complete as
well as a partial integration of the signal (for PSD analysis), and the possibility of
downloading a selected part of digitized signals.
1.3.2 Active Unit
In order to achieve the capability to detect non-radioactive materials, SMANDRA
has been extended with a second “active” module containing a neutron generator.
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In this configuration the sample becomes a target for the neutron beam, and we
register the secondary radiation induced by this bombardment.
The active box is shown together the passive one in Fig. 1.6.
Figure 1.6: SMANDRA active unit with the neutron generator
SMANDRA makes use of a EADS SODERN TPA17 sealed neutron generator,
remotely-controlled by a PC to reduce radiation hazard of the operator. Neutron
generator emits 107 neutron per seconds over the entire 4pi solid angle. In the passive
unit a shadow bar, made of iron and lead, is added to protect detectors from direct
radiation. Furthemore to tag the neutron beam towards the target the TPA17 em-
beds a YAP(Ce) scintillator for alpha particles that are associated with the neutron
production in the T+D reaction inside the neutron generator. This technique called
Tagged Neutron Inspection System (TNIS), ensures that only neutrons emitted in
a given direction towards the sample will result in a valid event [5]. Figure 1.7
reports the geometry of active inspection. The tagged neutron beam, emitted by
neutron generator (B), moves towards the target (C); inside the sample the emission
of characteristic γ-ray that hits the detector (A) is induced by neutrons.
Several materials like Carbon, Nitrogen, Oxygen, Iron etc, have a charactheristic
γ-ray signature resulting from inelasting excitation of the nuclei [13][14], then it is
possibile to recostruct the elemental composition of the sample by analyzing the
coincident γ-ray spectrum.
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Figure 1.7: Relative position of the detectors (A), the generator (B) and the target (C)
Chapter 2
SMANDRA detectors
2.1 Physics of the detectors
2.1.1 Inorganic scintillator
The detection capability of an inorganic scintillator depends on the structure of the
crystal lattice. In a pure inorganic crystal lattice such as NaI(Tl) or LaBr3(Ce),
electrons can occupy selected energy bands (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Energy band structure of an activated crystalline scintillator
The lower band, called Valence band, represents electrons that are essentially
bound at lattice sites. The upper band, called Conduction band, represents elec-
trons that have suffiecient energy to migrate freely throughout the crystal. The
forbidden band or Band gap represents the range of energies (usually few electron
volts) in which electrons can never be found. When incident radiation hits the crys-
tal, electrons can be elevated to the conduction band leaving a hole in the valence
band. The return of those electrons to the valence band causes the emission of
scintillation photons. The band gap widths in some pure crystals are such that the
wavelenght of resulting emitted photon is too high to lie in the visible region, for
this reason small amounts of impurities are added to the crystal (e.g. Tallium is
added to NaI in trace amounts) to lower the wavelenght of the emitted photons and
maximize scintillation efficiency. The impurities are called activators. They create
special sites in the lattice that modify the band gap structure. The result is an
energy level within the forbidden gap, through this level the electron can deexcite
back to the valence band. In this case the energy of the emitted photons is lower
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compared to the pure crystal gap and this transition can now give rise to a visible
photon, allowing of the detection process. There are three kinds of activator centers:
• Luminescence centers in which the de-excitation process give rise to a visible
photon that is at the basis of the scintillation process.
• Quenching centers in which the transition between excited states and the
ground state produces no visible photons. These processes represent loss mech-
anisms in the conversion of the particle energy to scintillation light.
• Traps in which the energy transition to the ground state is forbidden. In
this metastable level, the electrons can stay for a long time before acquiring
additional thermal energy to raise to a high-lying state from which deexcitation
to the ground state is possible. When the high-lying state corresponds to a
luminescence center, the delayed light emission is called phosphorescence.
The NaI(Tl) Crystal
NaI(Tl) detector shows an excellent light yield [15] and a large absorption efficiency
also for high-energy gamma rays [16] due to the relatively high atomic number
of Iodine (Z = 53) and to the crystal’s density. It can be produced into a wide
assortment of sizes and shapes. The energy response is close to be linear over a large
energy range [17]. All these characteristics made NaI(Tl) the standard scintillation
material for gamma-ray spectroscopy.
In the SMANDRA system a 5”x5” NaI(Tl) scintillator has been selected. The
large size is mainly due to the detection of energetic gamma rays in active investi-
gations and to the detection and identification of weak gamma sources.
Most relevant properties of the NaI(Tl) are shown in Table 2.1.
Density 3.67 g/cm3
Emission Maximum 415 nm
Decay Constant 0.23 µs
Refractive Index @ maximum 1.85
Hygroscopic yes
Table 2.1: Properties of NaI(Tl) detector
Figure 2.2 shows the absorption efficiency of NaI(Tl) detectors. The absorption
efficiency depends generally on:
• the detector material,
• the linear attenuation coefficient,
• the volume of the crystal,
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• its thickness in the direction of the incident radiation.
For a 5”x5” detector the absorption efficiency is always over 80% in the 0.1-10 MeV
that is the revelant energy range for SMANDRA.
Figure 2.2: Absorption efficiency of NaI(Tl) detector.
Another interesting parameter is the photopeak efficiency. A typical γ-ray spec-
tra includes several structure due to the different iteractions of the incident radi-
ation, e.g. photoelectric, Compton edge, single and double escape, backscattering
etc.. Counting the events in the full energy peak is the simplest way to identify
radiation source in the natural background. Furthermore it is possible to eliminate
some perturbing effects in the laboratory such as scattering from surrounding objects
using only full energy peak events. The peak to total ratio for NaI(Tl) detectors
of different size is shown in Figure 2.3. The photopeak efficiency is proportional
to the atomic number of the detector. Indeed, a lower value of the atomic number
and density of the material determines a poor photopeak efficiency. In Figure 2.4 is
shown an example of curves for a 3”x3” NaI(Tl) scintillator and 3”x3” PVT plas-
tic scintillator. The photopeak for the plastic scintillator is very weak and is not
observed above 60 keV.
The LaBr3(Ce) Crystal
The high-resolution detector of SMANDRA is a 2”x2” LaBr3(Ce) scintillator of the
Brilliance series, manufactured by Saint-Gobain, coupled to a standard Hamamatsu
R6231 photomultiplier with AS20 voltage divider. Most relevant parameters of the
detector are shown in table 2.2.
The LaBr3(Ce) scintillators are generally interesting for γ-spectroscopy measure-
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Figure 2.3: Peak to total ratio of NaI(Tl) detectors of different size. The numbers on each curve
refer to the scintillatore size. As an example, 10x10 refers to a cylinder scintillator 10
inches in diameter by 10 inches long.[18]
Figure 2.4: Comparison of the peak to total ratio for a 3”x3” NaI(Tl) detector and a PVT plastic
scintillator of the same size. [18]
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Internal activity peak 1436 keV
Density 5.08 g/cm3
Melting point 1116 K
Thermal expansion coefficient along C-axis 8 · 10−6 ◦C−1
Hygroscopic yes
Wavelength of emission max. 380 nm
Refractive index @ emission max 1.9
Primary decay time 0.016 µs
Light yield 63 photons/keVγ
Photoelectron yield (for γ-rays) 165% of NaI(Tl)
Table 2.2: Properties of LaBr3(Ce) detector
ments due to their good time resolution (of the order of few hundreds picoseconds)
and energy resolution (about 3% at 662 keV) [19][20][21]. These detectors, if made
with large volumes, are usable for high-energy γ-rays (up to 20 MeV). This is due
to the high Z of lanthanum and high density of the crystal. However the high cost
has prevented the diffusion for this type of applications [22].
The energy resolution is defined as the width of the distribution at half of the
maximum ordinate of the peak (FWHM) divided by the location of the peak cen-
troid. There are a number of potential fluctuation sources that lead to a deterioration
of the detector resolution:
• internal instability of the PMT tube,
• temperature dependence of the crystal light yield [23] [24],
• electronic noise within the detector and electronic system,
• statistical contribution arising from the discrete nature of the signal itself.
The latter one is the most relevant source of resolution degradation because
in some sense it represents the minimum fluctuation that will always be present
in the detector signal, with no correlation with the tecnical quality of the system.
The statistical noise arises from the non continuity of the variable representing the
charge Q generated within the detector by a quantum of radiation. For example in
a scintillation counters, Q represents the number of photon collected by the PMT
tube. If the total number of charge carriers is N the statistical fluctuations are
characterized by the standard deviation
√
N , then the resolution improves (FWHM
decrease) as N is increased. An ideal detector would have as many information
carriers generated per event as possibile, so that the limiting resolution would be
as small as possible. The dependence of resolution (R) from the energy of incident
γ-ray (E) can be predicted simply by noting that:
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1. the FWHM of the peak is proportional to the square root of the γ-ray photon
energy,
2. the average pulse height produced is directly proportional to E.
R =
FWHM
CENTROID
= K
√
E
E
=
K√
E
(2.1)
This means that the energy resolution is inversely proportional to the square
root of the γ-ray energy. Figure 2.5 [25] shows the function R(E) for LaBr3(Ce) of
different sizes and for NaI(Tl). The green line represents the expected curve, the
best fit is obtained for K = 76.3.
Figure 2.5: Dependency of energy resolution from γ-ray energy of the incident photon. Green line
is the expected curve with K = 76.3. Black line is a 3”x3” LaBr3(Ce) detector. Blue
diamond is a 2”x3” LaBr3(Ce) detector. Violet square is a 1”x1” LaBr3(Ce) detector
and violet line is from 3”x3” NaI(Tl) detector.
In Figure 2.5 we can notice that the energy resolution of the NaI(Tl) is three times
worse than the LaBr3(Ce) one [26]. This is due to the LaBr3(Ce) scintillator, that has
1.6 times the light output and is more than 10 times faster than NaI(Tl) [25]. This
can also produce non-linear effects in the PMT that manifests itself in two ways: the
FWHM of a peak is better than expected at that energy and the position of higher
energy peaks is at lower pulse heigth than expected from a linear extrapolation [7]
[27]. In order to minimize non-linear effects, one must select PMT with superior
linearity properties, like 8-stage PMTs.
In conclusion, the best resolution achievable by the LaBr3(Ce) derives from the
improved light production per unit of energy compared to NaI(Tl) and from a PMT
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with high photocathode quantum efficiency like our R6231 PMTs [28]. It is worth
mentioning that the R6231 PMTs have been often used with LaBr3(Ce) crystal in
spectroscopic applications for their high photocathode quantum efficiency but it is a
relatively slow device with a large transit time spread not properly suited for optimal
fast timing applications.
The LaBr3(Ce) detector suffers from internal activity [8]. The detector crys-
tal contains a small percentage of the radioactive isotope 138La as well as 227Ac,
including several daughter nuclides. Fig. 2.6 ([29]) represents a pulse height dis-
tribution showing the internal contamination of the LaBr3(Ce) detector along with
an explanation of the more relevant features in the pulse height distribution. The
measurement referred in [29] was made in a low-activity environment.
Figure 2.6: Spectrum from the internal contamination of the LaBr3(Ce) detector.
The main consequence of the internal activity is the presence of a multiplet at
1436 keV resulting from the decay of 138La (half-life of 1.05 · 1011) into 138Ba by
electron capture (66.4%). The multiplet is an effect of the combination of 1436 keV
photons and 32 keV X-ray photons from 138Ba. Another possibility is self-activity
due to the 138La decays through β-decay to 138Ce (33.6%). This branch releases a
789 keV γ coincident with a β, which has an endpoint energy of 255 keV. In this
case there is the possibility that the 789 keV γ-photon is completely absorbed in the
crystal. The resulting effect is that the β-continuum is shifted to a higher energy
creating the structure between 0.75 and 1 MeV [29][30]. Another contribution is
given by α-particles emitted from 227Ac with daughters. The energy of this particle
is in the order of several MeV but the peaks in the pulse height distribution appears
in the energy range of 1.5 to 3.0 MeV beacuse the light quenching for α-particles in
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the LaBr3(Ce) is lower than for β-particles and γ-photons [31][32].
A good use of LaBr3(Ce) detectors requires an accurate determination of the self-
activity, particularly when events are collected at low rates (few events per minute).
In fact, spurious peaks due to internal activity might affect the identification and
the measurement of the peaks of interest. On the other hand, if the internal activity
rate is negligible compared to the true event rate and/or can be eliminated with
the data-analysis (as in coincidence experiments), it can be used as an intrinsic
calibration source useful to monitor gain drifts. This is an essential point in the
measurement of continuum spectra.
Finally, in Figure 2.7 are shown the absorption efficiency (left) and peak to total
ratio (right) for LaBr3(Ce).
Figure 2.7: Absorption efficiency (left panel) and peak to total ratio (right panel) for LaBr3(Ce)
detector.
Comparing figures 2.7 and 2.3, we can notice that for NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce)
crystal of the same size, LaBr3(Ce) is better both in terms of total efficiency and in
the peak to total ratio.
2.1.2 Liquid scintillator
Liquid scintillators have many applications in neutron and gamma detection for
their distinctive features. Thanks to different base materials, they offer the possi-
bility of pulse shape discriminations, high flash point, performance at low or high
temperatures and increased neutron or photon cross sections. Liquid scintillator is
produced by dissolving an organic scintillator in an appropriate solvent. Sometimes
a third costituent is added as wavelenght shifter to tailor the emission spectrum to
better match the spectral response of common photomultiplier tubes. Most of these
liquids suffer for the presence of oxygen in the solution. Oxygen operates as a strong
quenching agent and can lead to the reduction of fluorescence efficiency. For this
reason the treatment of scintillation liquid must be done with great care. Normally
the solution is sold in appropiate selaed glass containers from which most of the
oxygen have been purged.
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The fluorescence process in liquid scintillators depends on the transitions in
the energy level structure of a single molecule and therefore can be observed from
a given molecular species independent on its physical state. This behaviour is in
contrast with crystalline inorganic scintillators such NaI(Tl), which require a regular
crystalline lattice as a basis for the scintillation process. For example anthracene,
one of the most used material in organic scintillators, is observed to fluoresce as
either a solid, vapor or as part of a multicomponent solution.
This organic molecules have a certain symmetry properties which give rise to
what is known as a pi-electron structure. In Figure 2.8 the pi-electronic energy levels
of this type of molecules is reported as an example.
Figure 2.8: Energy levels of an organic molecule with pi-electron structure
There are a series of singlet state (spin 0) labelled as S0, S1, S2, ... and a similar set
of triplet state with spin 1, labelled as T1, T2, T3, ... . Typical energy spacing bewteen
the ground and first level of the singlet state (S0 ⇒ S1) is 3-4 eV. Each of these
electronic configurations is further subdivided into a series of much finer spacing
(typical 0.15 eV) which correspond to various vibrational states of the molecule.
When a charged particle passes close to the molecule, it transfers part of its
kinetic energy that is absorbed. The higher states (S2, S3,...) are quickly deexcited
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in few picosecond to the S1 electron state through internal radiationless conversion as
well as states with excess vibrational energy (such S11 or S12) that are not in thermal
equilibrium with its neighbors. Therefore the net effect of an excitation process is
the population of the S10 state from which the prompt scintillation light is emitted
with a transition to S0 state. In most organic scintillators, prompt fluorescence is
relatively fast in the order of few nanosecond.
Another process, called intersystem crossing, can convert some S1 excited sin-
glet state into triplet state. Triplet state T1 has a lifetime much longer than the
singlet S1 state and deexcitation produces delayed light emission characterized as
phosphorescence. Furthemore, some molecules may be excited back to the S1 state
and subsequently decay through normal fluorescence. This process represents the
origin of the delayed fluorescence. Compared with the prompt decay time of a few
nanoseconds, the slow component will typically have a characteristic decay time of
several hundred of nanosecond. The importance of slow component derives from the
dependence of this light with the nature of the exciting particle. One can make use
of this correlation to discriminate between different particle like neutron, gamma,
alpha etc. that have deposited the same energy in the detector. In fact, the slow
component fraction depends primarly on the rate of energy loss dE/dx of the excit-
ing particle. As shown in Figure 2.9 the tail of the signal is greater for heavy particle
with large dE/dx. It is worth mentioning that neutrons do not release energy di-
rectly but the detection is based on elastic scattering of neutrons by light nuclei, in
the same way γ-ray trasfer a portion of kinetic energy throught compton scattering.
Figure 2.9: Pulse shapes in stilbene for different radiation’s types [33].
This important features is called Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD) and is widely
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applied to eliminate γ-ray events when an organic scintillator is used as neutron
detector [34][35][36].
NE-213
One of the historical scintillator for neutron spectroscopy was the liquid scintillator
NE-213 [37][38][39], manufactured in the past by Nuclear Enterprises Limited and
today by Bicron with the name of Saint-Gobain Scintillators or by Elyien Tech-
nologies. It consists of xylene, activators, the organic compound POPOP (as a
wavelenght shifter) and naphthalene, which is added to improve light emission. The
density of NE-213 is about 0.874 g/cm3 and its composition is taken to be CH1.21.
Its popularity is mainly due to its excellent pulse shape discrimination properties,
comparable with that of Stilbene and Anthracene [40]. It is usually encapsulated in
an aluminium or glass container, which allows the manufacturer to adapt its shape
in order to meet different requirements.
Density 0.874 g/cm3
Refractive index 1.508
Light output (% Anthracene) 78%
Decay time (fast) 3.7 ns
Wavelength of maximum emission 425 nm
Ratio of H to C atoms 1.213
Table 2.3: Properties of SMANDRA NE-213 detector
SMANDRA make use of an original 5”x 2”NE-213 detector, although in this
work a number of test have performed with modern EJ-301 and EJ-309 scintillators.
Figure 2.10: The light output for the LS-301 detector [41]. Points are the experimental data and
the solid line is Eq. 2.2, equivalent to the NE-213 scintillator
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As discussed in Sec. 2.1.2 neutrons incident on an organic scintillator produce
light indirectly, mainly via the knock-on protons from elastic collisions with hydro-
gen. In order to interpret a measured neutron pulse height spectrum, the relationship
between proton energy and light-output must be known. The light output function
for protons is usually described by equation 2.2:
L(Ep) = L0
E2e
Ee + L1
(2.2)
where Ee is the electron energy and L1,L0 are fitting parameters. For NE-213
scintillator, thre reader can refer to [42][41][43][44]. We report in Figure 2.10 a
recent work of Kornilov et al. [41] in which the relationship between the light output
versus proton recoil energy for a LS-3011 detector is shown.
Figure 2.11: The calculate efficiency of a NE-213 liquid scintillator (cylinder:1.5”x4”) for a discrim-
ination level of 0.81MeV. Identification of the symbols is the following: • combined
efficiency from all processes; ◦ single hydrogen scattering; × n-H, n-H double scat-
tering;  n-C, n-H double scattering; 4 n-C, n-H, n-H triple scattering;  (n,α) and
(n,n’)3α reaction.
The detection efficiency of a device based on recoil nuclei is proportional to the
scattering cross section of the nuclei and it depends on the shape and thickness of the
detector and on the energy threshold. At low neutron energies the cross section of
n-H reactions are predominant. Over 8-9 MeV other reactions must be considered,
as n-C or n-H double or triple scattering. In Figure 2.11 is shown the calculated
efficiency of a NE-213 detector [45].
1LS-301, produced by SCIONIX, is based on the EJ-301 scintillator, equivalent to the NE-213
neutron detectors
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2.1.3 Proportional counter
Proportional counters are a type of gas-filled detectors, based on the phenomenon
of gas multiplication. Tipically a proportional counter is a cylinder with a thin wire
placed along the central axis. This wire serves as anode while the cylinder, often
made of stainless steel, is used as cathode and conventionally grounded. In figure
2.12 a basic structure of a proportional counter is shown. A positive high voltage
Figure 2.12: Basic elements of a proportional counter
must be applied to attract the electrons from the gas toward the central wire. The
choice of the voltage is important because gas multiplication is a consequence of
the electric field. When a pair ion-electron is created by incident radiation, they
drift to their collecting electrodes acquiring kinetic energies beacuse of the applied
voltage. If the kinetic energy is greater than the ionization energy of molecule it
is possible to create, in another collision, an additional ion pair. This new electron
released is accelerated by the electric field, contributing to the creation of new free
electrons in a cascade process, called Townsend avalanche. There is a threshold
value of the field above which this secondary ionization will occur, typical value at
atmosferic pressure is of the order of 106 V/m. Under proper conditions, the number
of secondary ionization events can be kept proportional to the number of primary
ion pairs formed and the total number of ions can be multiplied by a factor of many
thousand, reducing the need of external amplifiers.
Helium-3 detector
3He proportional counters utilizes the 3He(n,p)3H reaction for the detection of neu-
trons:
3He + n (thermal) → p + 3H
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In an ideal large detector, one would expect each thermal neutron reaction to
deposit 764 keV in the form of kinetic energy of triton (191 keV) and proton (573
keV). The range of this reaction products is not always small compared with the
dimension of the tube. As a consequence the wall effect [46] is important for conven-
tional Helium-3 detector. In Figure 2.13 is shown an expected pulse height spectra
for a typical Helium-3 detector. The two steps correspond to the maximun kinetic
energy of proton and triton.
Figure 2.13: Typical pulse height spectrum for a 3He with significant wall effect
Many methods have been used to reduce this effect. The first obvious step is to
build the counter with a diameter as large as possible so that most iteractions occur
far away from the wall. Another possibility is to increase the pressure of the gas
and/or introduce a second heavier component, like krypton, to reduce the range of
reaction products.
The energy dependence of cross section in case of 3He follows the relation 1/v
(v = neutron velocity) up to 0.2 MeV as shown in Figure 2.14, resulting in greater
efficiency at lower energies. For thermal neutrons the value of cross section is 5330
barns.
In SMANDRA a shielding of polyethylene is added to slow down fast neutrons to
a lower energy value where the detector efficiency is greater. As shown in Figure 2.15
([47]) the efficiency of a unmoderated tube drops by over four orders of magnitude
between few eV and 10 MeV.
2.2 Neutron Generator
Small neutron generators using the deuterium (2H) - tritium (3H) reaction are the
most common accelerator based neutron sources. They offer a surprising technology,
because they can supply a neutron beam of high flux from a small source. Thus,
neutron generators based on those reactions can be used as a powerful tool in several
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Figure 2.14: Total cross section for 3He(n,p)3H reaction
Figure 2.15: Black diamonds show the response of a single unmoderated 3He neutron tube in counts
per incident neutron as a function of incident neutron energy, open circles are the
response of a moderated tube, and the open squares are the response of a moderated
detector assembly.
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fields in which there is demand of a beams of neutrons.
The operation’s principle is simple, a high-voltage is applied to extract a 2H+/3H+
beam from an ion source and to accelerate it towards the target where neutrons are
produced in DT, DD, or TT collisions.
2H + 2H → 3He + n Q = 3.27 MeV
2H + 3H → 4He + n Q = 17.59 MeV
2H + 3H reaction has the largest maximum cross-section of 5.0 Barn because the
neutron in excess on the tritium nuclide increases the size of nucleus and therefore
the cross section of fusion reaction. Maximum cross-section of this reaction for
energies of incoming particle below 1 MeV is reached at the energy of 130 keV for
deuterium (2H + 3H) and 195 keV (3H + 2H) for tritium. Table 2.4 reported fusion
energy release (Q), maximum cross section (in Barns) for energies below 1 MeV (
σmax) and the neutron kinetic energy (in MeV).
Reaction Q (MeV) σmax (barn) En (MeV)
2H + 2H → 3He + n 3.27 0.09 2.5
2H + 3H → 4He + n 17.59 5.0 14.1
Table 2.4: Some important parameters of the fusion reactions
Neutrons produced from the 2H + 3H reaction are emitted isotropically from the
target, instead neutron emission from the 2H + 2H reaction is slightly peaked in the
forward (along the axis of the ion beam) direction. In both cases, the He nucleus is
emitted in the exact opposite direction of the neutron.
The basic design of a modern compact accelerator neutron generator (an example
is shown in Figure 2.16) does not vary from those of other particle accelerators. It
consists of a source to generate positively charged ions; one or more structures to
accelerate the ions (usually by using a voltage between 80-180 kV); a metal hydride
target loaded with either deuterium, tritium, or a mixture of the two; and a gas-
control reservoir, also made of a metal hydride material.
The most common ion source used in neutron generators is a cold-cathode also
called Penning ions sources [48]. This simple ion source consists of a hollow cylin-
drical anode (usually biased 12 kV) with cathode plates at each end of the anode
(usually at ground potential). An external magnet is arranged to generate a coaxial
field of several hundred gauss within the ion source. When deuterium and/or tri-
tium gas is introduced into the anode at a pressure of 1 Pa, the electric field between
the anode and cathodes ionizes the gas. Electron confinement is established in this
plasma by the orientation of the electric and magnetic fields, which forces the elec-
trons to oscillate back and forth between the cathode plates in helical trajectories.
Although some low-energy electrons are lost and strike the anode (which creates
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Figure 2.16: Illustration of a neutorn generator with a Penning ion source
more secondary electrons) most remain trapped and ionize more gas molecules to
sustain the plasma. The ions are not similarly trapped, and when they strike the
cathodes, they also release secondary electrons, which enter the plasma and help
sustain it. Ions can escape the chamber into the acceleration section of the tube
through a hole at the center of one of the cathodes, called exit cathode.
There are other types of ion sources that are used in industrial applications, for
example hot-cathode sources, magnetrons, and radiofrequency ion sources. However,
the simple design and durability of the Penning ion source have made it the most
commonly used in industrial neutron generators [49].
TPA17 Neutron Generator
The compact Sodern GENIE APT 17 is the smallest portable neutron generator
dedicate to elemental analysis using the associated particle imaging (API) technique.
Elemental imaging using the API technique is based mainly on inelastic scattering
reactions. The Deuterium - Tritium (DT) reaction in the tube produces a 14 MeV
neutron and an associated alpha particle (with energy of 3.5 MeV) emitted at the
same time and in the opposite directions. The detection of the alpha particle can
be done with a segmented (multipixel) detector array [50] that gives the direction
of the correlated neutron emitted in a narrow beam. Neutron generators with built-
in particle detectors are becoming very popular for identification of the content of
different objects with high sensitivity and position resolution [51] [52]. The neutron
collides with a nucleus of the material under study and produces a γ-ray [13][14],
whose time of arrival at the detector can be precisely measured. This is therefore a
Time-of-Flight (TOF) method that allows to determinate the distance traveled by
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the neutron (as both the speed of the neutron and of the gamma are known) [53].
As its direction is also known, three-dimensional spatial resolution of objects can be
provided. A schematic diagram of API technique is shown in Fig. 2.17 and main
features are reported in Table 2.5.
Figure 2.17: Schematic diagram of Tagged Neutron Inspection System technique for non-destructive
inspections with neutrons.
Neutron Energy 14.1 MeV
Neutron emission 4pi 108 n/s
Alpha detector YAP(Ce)
Size 400x200x400 mm (LxWxH)
Weight 5.7 Kg
Accelerator Voltage 90 kV
Maximum Beam current 150 µA
Typical life time 5000 hours at 107 n/s
Table 2.5: Techical specification of Sodern GENIE TPA 17
YAP:Ce
In the TPA17 neutron generator a small inorganic crystal is used as α-particle de-
tector: Yttrium Aluminium Perovskite activated by Cerium (formula YAlO3:Ce,
abbreviated YAP:Ce) [54][55]. Due to the low spatial resolution achievable with a
single γ-detector and for the small dimension of the analyzed sample, it is not used
a multipixel detector. The YAP(Ce) detector is coupled with an external HAMA-
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MATSU R1450 photomultiplier, and the output signal is read by the same VME
electronics of the SMANDRA system. Most relevant parameters of the detector are
shown in Table 2.6.
Density 5.37 g/cm3
Refractive index 1.93
Light output (% NaI) 40%
Decay time (fast) 25/30 ns
Wavelength of maximum emission 370 nm
Table 2.6: Properties of YAP:Ce detector
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Chapter 3
Detector Characterization
This chapter describes the laboratory characterization of the detectors used in
SMANDRA system. Initial tests were done with traditional NIM electronics fol-
lowed by the new digital electronics based on fast digitizers. We will compare the
two type of read-out.
3.1 NaI(Tl)
The SCIONIX NaI(Tl) 5”x5”scintillator is used in SMANDRA both in passive and
active mode, as a high efficiency detector for searching and identifying radioactive
sources or to detect nuclear photons emitted from light nuclei (C, N, O) when they
are bombarded by neutrons in active configuration.
It is therefore necessary to individuate a “working point” that allows good energy
resolution and linearity in a range of 0.1 - 2 MeV for passive measurements, together
with a good time resolution and the possibility of sustain high counting rates in active
mode when the energy range is extended up to 8 MeV.
3.1.1 Energy Resolution
Figure 3.1: Relation between shaping time and resolution (FWHM) in NaI(Tl)
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Initial tests have been carried out to determine working condition using standard
NIM electronics (typically EGG ORTEC modules). First run selects the best shaping
time (ST) of the spectroscopic amplifier with a 22Na, with the detector operating
at a voltage of 700V. The best energy resolution is obtained with a ST of 1 µs as
shown in Figure 3.1. An energy resolution of 7.7% for the 511 keV full energy peak
is comparable with values reported in literature, as in Figure 2.5 [25].
3.1.2 Resolution at high energies
Resolution tests at high energies were performed with a AmBe source. A typical
resulting spectrum is shown in Fig. 3.2.
Figure 3.2: AmBe spectrum taken with NaI(Tl)
The spectrum, calibrated with the 22Na source, presents a peak at an energy
of 4.4 MeV, preceded by a structure around 4.0 MeV corresponding to first photon
escape. The energy resolution of the peak at 4.4 MeV is about 5.5%, mainly caused
by Doppler Broadening [56]. This is due to the fact that the 4.4 MeV gamma ray is
produced by the recoiling nucleus in the reaction 9Be(α,n).
3.1.3 Time resolution
The time resolution of the detector was studied by measuring gamma-gamma coin-
cidences with a 22Na soruce. An auxiliary detector, a fast plastic scintillator EJ-228
2”x 2”coupled to the PMT XP2020, was used. Intrinsic time resolution of EJ-228
is about 300-500 ps [FWHM] with a threshold between 0.2 and 1 MeV.
First set of measurements was dedicated to find the optimal value of the Constant
Fraction Time Discriminator (CFTD) delay (Ortec Mod. 935). Results in Fig. 3.3
show that it is possibile to get resolutions of the order of 3.5 ns [FWHM] with
minimum threshold on plastic scintillator and a threshold of 500 keV on the NaI(Tl)
with a delay of 22 ns.
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Figure 3.3: Relation between delay and time resolution in NaI(Tl)
Figure 3.4: Relation between threshold and time resolution in NaI(Tl)
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It is noticeable that for active inspections it is recommended a resolution of
2 ns, corresponding to about 10 cm of spatial uncertainty for 14 MeV Neutrons.
Obviously, this resolution is related to photons with energy greater than 1 MeV.
Analyzing gamma-gamma coincidences with the 60Co in function of NaI(Tl) CFTD
threshold (Fig. 3.4) we note that resolution decreases lower to 2.6 ns in case of
signals in range 1-1.3 MeV. Consequently it is possible to expect better performances
in active interrogations, near to the optimal value of 2 ns.
3.1.4 Count rate capability
The degradation of the NaI(Tl) performance with an increase of the count rate was
studied. Gamma-gamma coincidences have been measured with the 22Na source and
the fast plastic scintillator. The NaI(Tl) detector was loaded with a second source
(137Cs) not seen by the plastic scintillator. In this way, we sent always the same
signal to the DAQ, the coincidences between NaI(Tl) and plastic, corresponding to
different count rates in the NaI(Tl).
We registered energy resolution and relative shift (with respect to the lowest rate
measurements) as a function of the count rate. We repeated the measurements with
two different NIM amplifiers (Figures 3.5 and 3.6).
Figure 3.5: Relation between resolution and rate in NaI(Tl) for the two peaks of 22Na source.
It is noticeable a clear shift in amplification of about 10% at 40 kHz, with a
clearly correlated worsening of the energy resolution.
As a conclusion, the preliminary tests with NIM electronics for the NaI(Tl)
detectors are:
• operating voltage 700 Volt,
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Figure 3.6: Relation between peak shift and rate in NaI(Tl) for the two peaks of 22Na source.
• best resolution with a Shaping time of 1 µs,
• good linearity in the required energy domain,
• gain drift and loss of resolution at high rate (∼ 40 kHz),
• best CFTD external delay of 22 ns,
• time resolution about 2.6 ns with 1 MeV threshold.
3.2 LaBr3(Ce)
St. Gobain’s 2”x 2” LaBr3(Ce) detector will be used in SMANDRA both in passive
and active mode. Therefore we looked for good resolution and linearity in a range
of 0.1 - 2 MeV for passive measurements, together with a good time resolution and
the possibility of sustain high counting rates for active interrogations.
3.2.1 Energy resolution
First measures determined the optimal value of the signal shaping time to be used
in the NIM amplifier, operating the detector at HV = 750 Volt with 22Na source.
Results, reported in Fig. 3.7, show that ST values from 0.25 to 1 µs provide an
equivalent energy resolutions.
Once fixed ST to 1 µs, we studied the dependance of the energy resolution on
the high voltage (Fig. 3.8), we noticed that the value of HV = 700 V corresponds
clearly to the best performances.
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Figure 3.7: Relation between shaping time and resolution in LaBr3(Ce).
Figure 3.8: Relation between power supply and resolution in LaBr3(Ce).
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3.2.2 Resolution at high energies
High energy tests were performed with a AmBe source, whose spectrum is shown in
Fig. 3.9.
Figure 3.9: AmBe spectrum taken with LaBr3(Ce)
It was not possible to obtain the correct energy for the 4.4 MeV peak through
standard linear calibration based on 22Na or 60Co sources. Consequently we per-
formed a non-linear calibration using a second degree polynomial function. Cali-
brated spectrum shows the sequency of 4.4, 3.9, 3.4 MeV due to first and second
escape. It is worth mentioning that Monte Carlo simulations [57] predict a ratio of
5:4:3 between Full Energy, Single Escape and Double Escape, in accordance with
our data.
The measured energy resolution at 4.4 MeV is about 3.7%, mainly due to the
Doppler Broadening [56].
3.2.3 Time resolution
As in the previous case, we started in searching the best value for the delay of
the CFTD. Results are displayed in Fig. 3.10. The time resolution resolution sets
around 0.65 ns [FWHM] with minimum thresholds and a 16 ns delay.
Count rate capability
With the same procedure used for NaI(Tl) we analyzed resolution and relative shift
(with respect to the lowest measured rate of the two peaks, 511 and 1275 keV of the
22Na source) as a function of the count rate.
There is a quite large shift of about 7.5% at the count rate of 20 kHz, but this
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Figure 3.10: Relation between delay and time resolution in LaBr3(Ce)
Figure 3.11: Relation between resolution and rate in LaBr3(Ce)
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Figure 3.12: Relation between peak shift and rate in LaBr3(Ce)
seems not to affect the energy resolution that is in order with the specification of
the detector. This shift is probably due to strong afterglow in the LaBr3(Ce) [58]
and will be discussed in details in the next chapter with the new digital electronics.
As a conclusion, the preliminary tests of the LaBr3(Ce) detectors are:
• operating voltage 750 Volt,
• best resolution with ST = 1 µs (or less) integration of anode signal,
• linearity loss at high energies,
• gain is not stable at high counting rates,
• time resolution much lower than 1 ns with a delay of 16 ns for CFTD.
Internal background
In addition we have also studied the self-activity background in the LaBr3(Ce) de-
tector. As already discussed in Section 2.1.1 the background is due to the presence
of 138La (1 part over 104) and the contamination with 227Ac, chemically homologous
of lanthanium. Natural radioactivity inside the crystals is due to beta, gamma and
alpha emissions reported in Fig. 2.6 (see [29] [6] and Tables 3.1, 3.2).
The total self activity is reported to be 0.85 counts/(s/cm3) that in case of a
2”x 2” crystal corresponds to about 80 Hz. In our 3”x 3”crystal, we measured a
background of about 220 Hz with very low threshold.
Background spectra measured in this work is reported in Fig. 3.13. It is evident
the contribution of 138La and 227Ac.
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Isotope Decay Eβ− (keV) Ie (%) Eγ (keV) Iγ (%)
138La β− 252 ± 12 34 789 34
EC 66 1436 66
211Pb β− 1378 ± 8 100
207Tl β− 1423 ± 5 100
Table 3.1: Self-activity in LaBr3(Ce) crystals due to β decay
Absolute Relative Measured
Isotope Q (keV) Eα (keV) Eγ (keV) branch (%) branch (%) branch (%)
207Th 6146 5756 256 7.0±0.4 54±3 66±9
6146 5756 236 12.3±0.9 98±7 118±12
223Ra 5979 5716 144 3.2±0.1 25±1 24±11
154 5.6±0.1 43±1 37±9
5607 269 13.7±0.3 106±2 106±10
5540 324 3.9±0.1 30±1 26±8
338 2.8±0.1 22±1 27±8
219Rn 6946 6553 271 10.8±0.3 84±2 89±9
6946 6425 402 6.4±0.2 50±2 47±8
211Bi 6751 6278 351 12.9±0.1 100±1 100
Table 3.2: The comparison between the measured relative branch of α decay with that expected
assuming secular equilibrium
Figure 3.13: Background acquisition with LaBr3(Ce). Red regions are the contribution from
138La,
blue region is the contribution of 227Ac.
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Response to neutrons
Finally, the LaBr3(Ce) crystal has been also irradiated with neutrons from a source
of 252Cf. Neutron induced events were selected by time-of-flight measures against a
fast plastic. The spectrum of the neutron induced events is shown in Fig. 3.14.
Figure 3.14: Spectrum of neutron induced events in LaBr3(Ce)
Peaks visible in Fig. 3.14 correspond to gamma transitions in the 139La and
79,81Br nuclei, induced by inelastic scattering of neutrons. Table 3.3 [59] contains a
more detailed explanation of the structure:
Experimental NNDC database
Eγ (keV) Nucleus Eγ (keV)
160 139La 166
210 79Br 207
270 81Br 260
81Br 275
380
513
550 81Br 538
81Br 566
750
810 81Br 836
Table 3.3: Neutron induced gamma transitions in LaBr3(Ce)
The results are in good agreement with the data from NNDC database.
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3.3 NE-213
The neutron detector NE-213, has a diameter of 5”and 2”thickness, and is charac-
terized by using γ-ray and neutron source to find out best working conditions to
discriminate fast neutrons from γ-rays and optimize the energy resolution of the
detector.
3.3.1 Calibration with 22Na source
The energy calibration of a liquid or plastic scintillator has been matter of several
studies in the past due to the special characteristics of this type of detector ([60];
[61]). In fact the low average atomic number of the plastic material implies that
photons emitted by typical radioactive sources interact only by Compton scattering.
In this case the nominal energy of the Compton Edge is well known. However, the
finite pulse resolution of the scintillation detector implies that the position of the
maximum in the Compton events distribution is shifted to lower energies, with the
shift depending on the detector pulse resolution. In order to solve this problem,
some empirical prescriptions have been developed in the past and simulations by
Monte Carlo methods are commonly used to determine the shift value by fitting the
experimental distribution. In this work we use a simplified method [62].
Calibration procedure
We construct the expected distribution of the Compton events using the Klein-
Nishina formula [63]:
dσ
dT
=
pir2e
mec2α2
·
(
2 +
s2
α2(1− s)2 +
s
(1− s)
(
s− 2
α
))
where T is the kinetic energy of the scattered electron, re is the classical electron
radius, α = hν/mec
2, s = T/hν and hν is the initial photon energy. The overall
pulse height resolution of the detector is reproduced by a Gaussian smearing of
the predicted distribution [64] [65]. As an example, we compare the effect of the
Gaussian smearing corresponding to width values of σ = 5, 10, 15 and 25 keV
with the theoretical distribution (see Fig. 3.15). It appears, as expected, that the
maximum in the Compton distribution moves to a lower energy value by decreasing
the pulse height resolution.
The energy calibration of liquid scintillators is performed by the following steps:
1. measuring a high statistics pulse height distribution using a 22Na gamma ray
source,
2. producing a set of theoretical Compton distributions for the 511 keV and 1275
keV gamma rays with Gaussian smearing for different values of the width
3.3. NE-213 45
Figure 3.15: The effect of different gaussian smearings over a theoretical Compton Edge
(usually from 10 to 200 keV),
3. determining, by a χ2 analysis, the width that better reproduces the experimen-
tal distribution. The best-fit width value determines directly the energy shift
of the nominal Compton Edge, used to calibrate the spectra and the energy
resolution of the detector. Furthermore, the variance of the χ2 distribution
provides information about the sensitivity of this method.
Figure 3.16: Fitting experimental Compton Edge spectrum for liquid scintillator
An example of the above procedure is reported in Fig. 3.16 for the 22Na spec-
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trum measured by one of our EJ301 liquid scintillators. The result of the spectrum
analysis is also shown. It is found that the best fit values for the width of the
Gaussian smearing are σ = 32 keV (σ = 52 keV) for the 511 keV (1275 keV) pho-
ton, respectively. This resolution values imply shifts of 53 keV and 84 keV for the
two maxima in the spectrum respect to the nominal Compton Edge energies. The
sensitivity of this method is typically 10% of the σ value. It is worth mentioning
that this method was first tested by using high resolution HPGe spectra where the
energy calibration was obtained either by using directly the full-energy peaks or by
the method previously presented. It is found that, in this case, the two calibrations
are very close within the experimental uncertainties. In the same way it was also
verified that our results are very close to those of [66]; here the method makes use
of a linear fitting of the falling region of the spectrum at energies higher than the
Compton Maximum to get an estimate of the detector resolution.
In Fig. 3.17 we show a typical calibrated spectra for the NE-213 SMANDRA
detectors. The energy resolution (σ) is, in this case, 40 keV for the the 511 keV
photon and 68 keV for the 1275 keV one.
Figure 3.17: Calibration spectrum of NE-213
This type of calibration is used in all the following paragraphs. Such calibration
values are espressed in units of keVee (keV electron equivalent) defined as the energy
of a photon that produces a given impulse in the scintillator. Note that recoil
protons generated by neutrons through elastic scattering on Hydrogen nuclei inside
the scintillator produce less light compared to electrons of the same kinetic energy.
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3.3.2 Pulse Shape discrimination
It is know that the scintillation light is composed of two components, one faster
than the other (see section 2.1.2). The fast component is due to prompt fluorescence
and is characterized by a decay time of the order of few ns. The slow component
corresponds to the delayed fluorescence and has a typical decay time of the order
of 50-100 ns. The ratio between fast and slow components depends on the kind
of particle which causes the ionization as show in Fig. 2.9. Taking into account
that neutron produces protons when interacting with scintillator while a γ produces
electrons, the produced light shows a different distribution as demonstrated in Fig.
3.18 where is clear the different amplitute of the tail of the signal. The analysis of
the signal provide the possibility to discriminate between neutrons and γ-ray.
Figure 3.18: Signal for neutron (green) and γ-ray (red) of the same energy. The tail of the signal
allows us to discriminate them.
We used the classical method of integrating the total signal and the delayed
component by using standard NIM modules. Signal corresponding to delayed com-
ponent was obtained with a 150 ns gate, delayed by 15 ns from the beginning of the
impulse.
In Fig. 3.19 we report a bidimensional graph of the total integral (PH TOT)
versus the delayed component (PH D). It is noticeable that neutron/gamma discrim-
ination works well for pulse height larger than 200 keVee, corresponding to neutron
energies of 0.7 MeV or greater (note that average energy of fission neutrons is about
2 MeV).
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Figure 3.19: Neutron/gamma ray discrimination plot
Chapter 4
Improvement with Digital
Electronics
4.1 VME technology
VMEbus is a computer architecture. The term ’VME’ stands for VERSA Module
Eurocard and was first defined in 1980 by a group of manufacturers. This group
was composed of researchers from Motorola, Mostek and Signetics corporations.
The suffix “bus” is a generic term describing a computer data path, hence VMEbus
represents a standardized extension of VERSA mechanically compatible with the
Eurocard board standard that is now an IEC standard as ANSI/IEEE 1014-1987,
widely used in various physical and engineering applications. Since its introduction,
VMEbus generated thousands of products and attracted hundreds of manufacturers
of boards, mechanical hardware, software and bus interface chips. It continues to
grow and support different applications such as industrial controls, military systems,
telecommunications, office automation and instrumentation systems.
Unlike NIM standard, the use of VME bus allows direct communication between
different boards hosted in the same crate: each board is identified by a logical 32
bit address (“base address”) defined by a switch on the board itself. The first
board of the crate acts as controller of data flow. In each board, a set of readable
memory registers contains the data. Another set of writeable registers is available for
committing istructions or writing down configuration parameters. The possibility
to operate all the boards from the controller is of great advantage because results in
various levels of automation of an experiment. In our configuration, the controller
board is connected to a PC and driven by a dedicated software interface developed
for this project.
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4.2 VME prototype crate
We use prototype battery-operated VME mini-crate (4 slots), based on commercial
model CAEN VME8004 (see Fig. 4.1). The table 4.1 describes its main features.
Mechanics 19”VME case, 4 slots 6U, 160mm VME boards
Dimensions 19”width, 2U height
Backplane VME64 J1/J2, 4 slot Automatic daisy chain
Mains Input Auto range: 90÷264 Vac, 47÷63 Hz
Output power 250 W @ 110÷264 Vac
Maximum Current 25 A @ +5 V 16 A @ +12 V 1 A @ -12 V
Isolation CE acc. to EN 61010
Noise and ripple < 60 mVpp @ +5 V
< 160 mVpp @ +12 V
< 250 mVpp @ -12 V
Operation 0÷50 ◦C without derating
Cooling Airflow 66 m3/h
Table 4.1: Properties of CAEN VME8004 minicrate
Figure 4.1: CAEN VME8004 minicrate
The controller slot is the lower one. The internal mechanical layout of SMAN-
DRA has been designed specifically to accomodate this crate, providing adequate
air-flow for cooling requirements.
4.3 USB bridge
A USB bridge model CAEN V1718 (shown in Fig. 4.2) provides standard connection
with the computer, with a maximum transfer rate of 30 MB/s (see Table 4.2 for
further details).
This module, placed in the first position on VME-crate, provides electrical inter-
face between computers and the VME and takes care of the conversion from software
commands to VMEbus hardware language. Every board corresponds to a library
containing its own specific set of high-level instructions (e.g. for rising a voltage
or reading a register). The use of V1718 and its standard library allows to avoid
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building from scratch a direct interface to the VME bus using a raw programmable
board.
Figure 4.2: CAEN V1718 USB bridge
Packaging 1-unit wide and 6U high VME module
PC Interface USB 2.0 compliant
Transfer rate 30 Mbyte/s
Panel outputs 5 NIM/TTL, programmable
Panel inputs 2 NIM/TTL, programmable
Table 4.2: Properties of CAEN V1718 USB bridge
4.4 HV power supply
High-Voltage power supply is provided through the programmable board V6533 HV
Power Supply for all the detectors (Fig. 4.3). It is housing 6 high voltage power
supply channels 4kV, 3mA (9W max), three of them positive and the others negative.
The channels share a common floating return, which allows on-detector grounding
reducing the noise level. Other relevant properties are summarized in Table 4.3.
VMAX hardware 0÷4 kV common to all board channels
Polarity Positive or Negative; common floating return
Max. Output Current 3 mA (9W max)
Voltage Set/Monitor Resolution 100 mV
Current Set/Monitor Resolution 50 nA
Output Voltage 0÷4 kV (connector output)
VMAX hardware accuracy 2% of FSR
VMAX software 0÷4 kV selectable for each channel
VMAX software resolution 100 mV
Voltage Ripple 1kV/500A: 3mV Typical / 5mV Maximum
2kV/1mA: 3mV Typical / 5mV Maximum
4kV/2mA: 12mV Typical / 20mV Maximum
3kV/3mA: 10mV Typical / 20mV Maximum
Ramp Up/Down 1÷500 V/s, 1 V/s step
Table 4.3: Properties of CAEN V6533 power supply
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It is possibile to power different detectors, or study the response to power of a
single detector, simply changing a value in the software configuration file.
Figure 4.3: CAEN V6533 high voltage supply board
The V6533 also integrates a temperature sensor for each channel, providing a
simple way to continuously monitor the temperature inside the crate.
4.5 Digitizer
The most important board of SMANDRA electronics is the V1720 digitizer board,
together with its advanced programmable FPGA.
Figure 4.4: CAEN V1720 digitizer
The board is a simple 8-channel, 12bit, 250 MS/s digitizer (main features in
Table 4.4), but the built-in programmable FPGA makes the difference with the
other types of digitizer. Inside the FPGA can be implemented different firmwares
dedicated to specific advanced functions. In SMANDRA we implemented Digital
Pulse Processing (DPP) algorithms, providing the following online services for each
event:
• time stamp - a reference time of the event from the beginnig of the acquisition,
• both complete and partial integration of the signal - used for Pulse Shape
Discrimination (PSD) in the liquid scintillator
• the possibility of storing a selected part of the digitized signal for off-line
analysis - e.g. to performing digital CFTD for coincidences recostruction.
The sampling of the signal with V1720 is customizable in many ways, from the
trigger mode (by threshold or by peak identification) to the number of samples to
save in the records, and each channel has an independent configuration registry.
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Analog Input 8 channels, single-ended (SE) or differential.
Input range: 2 Vpp; Bandwidth: 125 MHz.
Digital Conversion Resolution: 12 bit. Sampling rate: 31,25 to
250 MS/s simultaneously on each channel
Memory Buffer 1.25 M sample/ch or 10 M sample/ch;
Multi Event Buffer with independent read and write access.
Divisible into 1 ÷ 1024 buffers.
Trigger Individual channel autotrigger
Trigger Time Stamp 32bit - 8ns (34s range). Sync input for Time Stamp alignment
VME interface VME64X compliant; Multi Cast Cycles Transfer rate:
60MB/s (MBLT64), 100MB/s (2eVME), 160MB/s (2eSST).
Sequential and random access to the data.
Input connectors Single ended: MCX Differential: Tyco MODU II
Table 4.4: Properties of CAEN V1720 digitizer
4.5.1 Principle of operation
The basic operating mode of a digitizer is essentially the same as a digital oscillo-
scope: the analog signal, after an input stage of signal conditioning mainly used to
adapt the dynamic range, is sampled by a flash ADC and stored in a circular mem-
ory buffer of a programmable size. At the arrival of the trigger, the buffer is frozen
and made available for the readout while the acquisition continues in a new buffer.
There are few important differences with digital oscilloscope and classical analog
eletronic. The digitizers allow for deadtimeless acquisition. They have the ability to
accept two consecutive triggers very close to each other thanks to the multi-buffer
memory management: there is no dead time between an acquisition window and the
next one. This characteristic is a very important distinctive feature respect to the
dead time of analog electronic chains. Furthemore all the channels are allowed to
generate triggers independently. The individual trigger can be used locally by the
channel that generated it or can be use to generate a global trigger for all the chan-
nels in the board. It is possible to synchronize several boards with a common clock
reference to make an acquisition system with a theoretically unlimited number of
channels aligned in time to have, for example, events with correlated time stamps.
Another distinctive fact is the high bandwidth readout that starts from 30MB/s
with the USB connection to reach 160MB/s with optical link technology. Finally
with the FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) it is possible to perform on line
data processing. FPGAs are programmable devices with the ability to manage the
ADC sample stream and implement online digital algorithms for signal processing.
This feature is very important for the implementation of systems that are not simply
based on the acquisition, storage and readout of waveforms (raw data) but rather
on the calculation of certain quantities of interest (e.g. the charge associated with a
54 CHAPTER 4. IMPROVEMENT WITH DIGITAL ELECTRONICS
pulse, the pulse height, the leading edge, the baseline, the arrival time and other pa-
rameters) and the storage and transfer of just the final results, with clear advantages
in terms of readout bandwidth. In Fig. 4.5 is shown an example of the possibile
implementation of the FPGA. It represents a diagram of the operation during a
charge integration of the signal.
Figure 4.5: Signal sampling with explanation of different acquisition parameters.
As discussed before, the board digitizes input signals in a continous way and the
samples are stored in a buffer. When the trigger condition is satisfied, the analysis
algorithm goes back along the sample array, according to the PRE-TRIGGER set-
ting and opens the acquisition windows. PRE-GATE parameters define the starting
point of the integration that ends according to the LONG and SHORT GATE value.
The resulting values are stored in the DATA buffer, together with the desired num-
ber of raw samples and a time tag of the event. This operation is done independently
for each enabled channel, with a common clock every 4 ns. To optimize the FPGA
performances several of this parameters need to be tuned. This optimization was
performed empirically, by scanning for each parameter a range of possible values
and measuring for each setting the energy resolution of the detector. For LaBr3(Ce)
and NaI(Tl) detector we used full energy peak from 22Na to calculate the detector
resolution. For the liquid scintillator we used the procedure described in Section
3.3.1 was used.
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4.6 Optimization of FPGA parameters
The 12bit FlashADC uses 4096 channels for digitizing signals, and the default base-
line is set at half of the range, that corresponds to 2100 channel. Considering that
we use only negative pulses, we set the DC offset value to -36 units for all channels;
in this way the baseline raises to channel 4000 and the available dynamical range of
the FADC is doubled.
After that, we carried out a specific study on each detector to define the best
operating values for all the other parameters with particular attention to LONG-
GATE, PRE-GATE and BSLTHRESHOLD. The SHORT-GATE parameter is rele-
vant only in the case of liquid scintillator NE-213 for neutron/gamma ray discrim-
ination. The optimization is done recursively, every optimized parameter is used
to optimize the next parameter. When the processing is done, we restart from the
first parameter until the best value doesn’t change. The data reported in the next
section regard the last optimization process.
4.6.1 NaI(Tl) gamma detector
The signal of NaI(Tl) detector takes of about 750 ns long, with a raising time of
about 100 ns. The 250 M/s FADC has an internal clock of 4 ns, that is the time
width of each bin, so the integration gate must be greater than 200 intervals (800
ns).
We performed an initial “coarse” optimization of the LONG-GATE, locating the
minimum resolution in a working range between 200 and 250 units. Then we did a
fine search, varying the LONG-GATE value from 170 to 260 with steps of 10 units.
Results reported in Fig. 4.6 show the measured energy resolution for the two
peaks of a 22Na source as a function of LongGate duration (in 4 ns units). We can
Figure 4.6: NaI(Tl) scintillator: LongGate optimization
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notice that the value of 260 (corresponding to 1040 ns) gives best resolution at both
energies.
Then, we search for the best value of the PRE-GATE parameter using the same
procedure; PRE-GATE starts from the time where signal overcomes threshold, and
has been set from a value of 15 to 50 (between 60 and 200 ns). The results are
shown in Fig. 4.7.
Figure 4.7: NaI(Tl) scintillator: PreGate optimization
Even the data present show some fluctuation, we fix the best value for PRE-
GATE to 25 units, equivalent to 100 ns.
Last parameter to be analyzed is BSLThreshold that specify the threshold value
under which the FPGA can sample the baseline value of the signal. Best value is
found to be 3.
Energy resolution values measured after the optimization are summarized in
Table 4.5 and compared to previous measurements carried on the same detector but
with NIM amplifier and ADC.
NaI(Tl) Standard NIM FADC V1720
Energy Resolution @ 511 keV 7.51% 7,01%
Energy Resolution @ 1275 keV 4.87% 4.62%
Table 4.5: Resolution for NaI(Tl) scintillator
A significant improvement of the measured energy resolution using FADC V1720
is obtained at the lower energy.
4.6.2 LaBr3(Ce) gamma detector
The signal of LaBr3(Ce) detector is about 100 ns long with a raising time of 20 ns.
LongGate parameter has been varied from 25 to 60 units (corresponding to 100
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to 240 ns) with a step of 5 units; results with the same 22Na source are shown in
Fig. 4.8.
Figure 4.8: LaBr3(Ce) scintillator: LongGate optimization
The best value for LONG-GATE in case of LaBr3(Ce) detector is 40 units (160
ns).
PRE-GATE has been optimized in the range from 15 to 50 units (60 to 200 ns);
results are shown in Fig. 4.9.
Figure 4.9: LaBr3(Ce) scintillator: PRE-GATE optimization
In Fig. 4.10 we report the resolutions for three values of BLSThreshold. Best
performances are obtained with the value 5.
As in case of the NaI(Tl) detector, the measured energy resolutions of LaBr3(Ce)
scintillator with FADC V1720 are compared with the NIM measured values (see
Table 4.6).
With FADC V1720 the energy resolution values improve significantly. At the
energy of 511 keV the performances of VME digitizer improve of about 10% respect
58 CHAPTER 4. IMPROVEMENT WITH DIGITAL ELECTRONICS
Figure 4.10: LaBr3(Ce) scintillator: BSLThreshold optimization
LaBr3(Ce) Standard NIM FADC V1720
Energy Resolution @ 511 keV 3.70% 3.32%
Energy Resolution @ 1275 keV 2.25% 2.16%
Table 4.6: Resolution for LaBr3(Ce) scintillator
to the values obtained with NIM electronics. For this detector Saint-Gobain guar-
antees resolution better than 3.5% on 137Cs peak at 662 keV. With the same source
we measured a resolution of 3.12%, 11% better than nominal value.
4.6.3 NE-213 fast neutron detector
This detector is used as neutron detector. Consequently, the neutron/gamma ray
discrimination is crucial. As a consequence, FPGA parameters have been optimized
to maximize the discrimination capability.
To evaluate the “quality” of the discrimination it is necessary to define some pa-
rameters. First of all, we filled a 2-D scatter plot where events are defined by total
charge QLong and by the charge in the signal tail (Qlong−Qshort) normalized to Qlong.
The tail-to-full ratio (Qlong −Qshort)/Qlong is typicall used for neutron/gamma dis-
crimination.
Results shown in Fig. 4.12 were obtained with a 252Cf source. We then defined a
threshold on total charge of 400 keVee (keV electron equivalent: as it was produced
by gamma radiation) corresponding to a 1.7 MeV neutron cut. Threshold channel
in Fig. 4.11 is at channel 2000.
The 1-dimensional plot shown in Fig. 4.12 is obtained projecting the 2-D scatter
plot, from channels 2000 (1.7 MeV) to 16000 (7.4 MeV), on the Y axis. Here the
peak due to gamma signals, to the left, for which (Qlong − Qshort)/Qlong < 0.1, is
clearly separated from that of the neutrons, (Qlong − Qshort)/Qlong > 0.1. At this
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Figure 4.11: NE-213 scintillator: optimization of the neutron/gamma discrimination
point we can define the Figure Of Merit (FOM) as follow:
FOM =
FWHMN + FWHMG
PEAKN − PEAKG
where PEAKN e PEAKG are the centroids of the peaks and FWHMN , FWHMG
have the usual meaning, N and G indexes being related to neutrons and gammas,
respectively.
Figure 4.12: Figure of Merit (FOM)
Obviously, a better separation between the two peaks corresponds to a better
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neutron/gamma discrimination and a higher FOM.
In the case of the liquid scintillator we have two gates to optimize: the LONG-
GATE and the SHORT-GATE. After some quick tests we set the SHORT-GATE
at the temporary value of 15, and optimize the LONG-GATE monitoring the FOM.
Data are reported in Fig. 4.13.
Figure 4.13: NE-213 scintillator: LongGate optimization. FOM is defined in the text.
Better discrimination performances correspond to the LONG-GATE value of 80
units (320 ns). Fixed the LONG-GATE the optimization procedure is applied to
SHORT-GATE. The results are lined out in Fig. 4.14. Best separation is related to
a value of 12 units (48 ns).
Figure 4.14: NE-213 scintillator: ShortGate optimization. FOM is defined in the text.
Also in case of the NE-213 detector we can compare the on-line FPGA data with
off-line results performed analyzing raw events recorded from the FADC or directly
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processing the signals with NIM hardware. Table 4.7 compares the values for an
energy window of 400 - 1400 keVee.
NE-213 On-line Off-line analysis Hardware analysis
FADC analysis of FADC data with NIM electronics
FOM 1.08 1.05 0.9
Table 4.7: NE-213 scintillator: FOM obtained with a window of 400-1400 keV
On-line discrimination with the FPGA has nearly the same performances of
an off-line analysis of digitized pulses, but allows higher acquisition rates. NIM
performances are slightly worse. It is worth mentioning that a much better FOM
is obtained by using modern scintillator assembly respect to the results reported in
this section.
4.7 Performance at high counting rates
4.7.1 LaBr3(Ce)
The energy resolution of the LaBr3(Ce) scintillator was first tested as a function of
the counting rate up to about 20 kHz by using standard NIM electronics ( ORTEC
Amplifier mod.570) and a 22Na source. The measured energy resolution (δE/E),
computed as FWHM/E is rather constant with the rate by using Shaping Time
value ST= 0.5µs or ST= 1.0µs. Typical values are δE/E= 3.7% at 551 keV and
δE/E= 2.25% at 1275 keV, in agreement with the producer specification (in our case
energy resolution lower than 3.5% at 662 keV). Our measured energy resolutions
are comparable with those reported in [7, 27] for 2”x 2” and 3”x 3” crystals with
standard NIM electronics read-out. Other measurements were performed using the
V1720 digitizer with the optimized DPP parameters. The counting rate varied up to
several kHz by changing the source position and, for rate over 50 kHz, by stacking
on the front face of the scintillator a combination of several different sources. A
sample of the obtained spectra is reported in Fig. 4.15.
In Fig. 4.16 we present a summary of the energy resolution measured as a func-
tion of counting rate. The energy resolution is generally better than that measured
using standard NIM electronics and is generally lower than the value declared by
Saint-Gobain up to very high rates (i.e. 340 kHz).
To understand the worsening of the energy resolution above 100 kHz, a specific
test of the V1720 card was performed by using a BNC Pulse Generator mod. PB-4
and a Timing Filter Amplifier ORTEC. This was made to obtain a pulse with a
shape similar to the LaBr3(Ce) one. Results from the pulser test, reported in Fig.
4.17, demonstrate that the electronics contribution to the energy resolution belongs
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Figure 4.15: Gamma ray spectra measured with the LaBr3(Ce) scintillator with a
137Cs and a 60Co
source at total rate of 1.5 kHz (left panel) and 145 kHz (right panel). The energy
calibration was established at the lower rate.
Figure 4.16: Energy resolution of the LaBr3(Ce) scintillator with the V1720 read-out as a function
of the count rate. Squares are relative to the 137Cs gamma line (0.662 MeV) whereas
triangles and diamonds are related to the 60Co lines (1.33 and 1.17 MeV)
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to the range δE/E= 0.50 ± 0.05% up to about 180 kHz and then increases up to
about 0.6% at 220 kHz. Such contribution to the overall energy resolution reported
in Fig. 4.16 is certainly negligible and its variation with the rate does not explain
the registered worsening of the energy resolution.
Figure 4.17: Energy resolution of the V1720 card as a function of the rate measured during the
pulser tests.
It is worth mentioning that very high count rate applications of LaBr3(Ce) scin-
tillators have been recently reported in the fields of safeguards [67] and plasma
diagnostics [68], although a direct comparison of our measured energy resolution
rate at high rate it is not possible. It is interesting to note that in [68] the reported
energy resolution is lower than 2.4% at 662 keV for a 1.5”x 1.5” crystal up to 40
kHz.
Looking in more detail at Fig. 4.15, it appears that the peaks are apparently
shifted at higher energy when the detector load is increased. This effect appears
as well in measurements with standard NIM electronics (7% shift at 20 kHz with
respect to the peak position measured at 1 kHz.) and does not depend on the gamma
ray energy. The shift is magnified at higher rates in the measurements performed
with the V1720 digitizer as illustrated in Fig. 4.18, with a measured shift value of
about 16% at 250 kHz.
This effect was studied in detail performing the following operations:
• changing the HV power supply and the current limits in biasing the detector,
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Figure 4.18: Measured shift in the peak position as a function of the detector rate as measured
with the V1720 digitizer. Squares are relative to the 137Cs gamma ray (0.662 MeV)
whereas triangles are related to the shift measured with pulser.
• replacing the PMT voltage divider with other components available in our Lab
(e.g. home made voltage divider, ORTEC or SILENA devices),
• pulser test.
We varied the high voltage of several hundred of volts with a consequent variation
of the detector gain, but the relative shift of the peaks remains the same. Also the
variation of current limits do not leads to an explanation of the effect. With some
voltage divider (as the SILENA), the rate increase causes a shift down of the peak
position with a loss of energy resolution. In all the other cases the shift is confimed.
Also in this case one can learn something from the pulser run: the variation of the
pulser peak position up to 220 kHz is generally lower than 3% compared to the 1
kHz value. In Fig. 4.18 we can notice that the shift measured with the pulser is
very close to the gamma source values up to 80 kHz and remains constant up to over
200 kHz, whereas the shift of the gamma ray peak position increases remarkably for
rates higher than about 80 kHz.
It is quite interesting to notice that the shift in the peak position for rates higher
than 80 kHz is clearly associated with the degradation of the energy resolution from
about δE/E = 2.9% [FWHM] at 80 kHz to δE/E = 3.2% [FWHM] at 220 kHz
for the 662 keV 137Cs gamma ray. It is know that the LaBr3(Ce) crystal exhibits
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a significant afterglow component that might affect the signal-to-noise ratio [69].
Recently, Moszyski [70] reported indeed an interesting correlation of the intrinsic
energy resolution of scintillation crystals with their afterglow. Thus the shift effect
evidenced in fig.4.18 can be qualitatively explained by the afterglow emission in the
crystal.
The measured gamma ray spectrum at the detector load of 340 kHz is presented
in Fig. 4.19. Because of the rate-dependent shift, the energy calibration was ob-
tained by using the 241Am (59 keV), 22Na (511 and 1275 keV), 137Cs (662 keV) and
60Co (1.17 and 1.33 MeV) transitions. It appears that the sum peak of the 60Co
source (2.5 MeV) and the 4.4 MeV line from AmBe show up at lower energies than
expected, revealing a non-linearity of the system for the higher pulse heights. Such
effect has been evidenced in [7][27] and were explained as conseguence of the satura-
tions of the PMT. In particular, hardware solutions to this problem have been tested
in [27]. As for our detector, the non-linearity has been compensated by using an
additional quadratic term into the energy calibration. This procedure is necessary
in active interrogations when photons in the range 2-7 MeV are of primary interest.
Figure 4.19: Gamma ray spectrum taken with a cocktail source at the total rate of 340 kHz. Tri-
angles mark the 22Na (511 and 1275 keV) transitions, the full dot marks the 137Cs
transition (662 keV) and the squares mark the 60Co (1.17 and 1.33 MeV) transitions.
4.7.2 NE-213 liquid scintillator
We performed some test at high counting rate with a AmBe source placed at different
distances from the liquid scintillator detector. For each run, the FOM value has been
calculated for a window from channel 2000 (1.7 MeV) and channel 16000 (7.4 MeV).
Fig. 4.20 shows a typical 2D scatter plot and FOM plot with AmBe source placed
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at 11 centimiters with an acquisition rate of 5.3 kHz.
Figure 4.20: On the left panel, NE-213 scatter plot from an AmBe. On the right panel a unidimen-
sional projection of the PSD value with a pulse gate from channel 2000 (1.7 MeV) and
channel 16000 (7.4 MeV)
Using an AmBe source we get a better FOM respect to the on obtained with
252Cf; this is due to different energies involved in the decays, as well as a better
neutron-to-gamma emission ratio.
The FOM values as a function of the rate are reported in Fig. 4.21.
Figure 4.21: NE-213 detector, FOM as a function of rate (AmBe source)
It is evident a worsening of the FOM at high rate of about 20%. There are several
sources of instability that contribute to this degradation. First of all there is the
possibility of fake neutron events caused by physical effects in the detector as signal
pileup or caused by statistical problem as the tail of the gamma-ray peak printing
towards the neutron region. With an appropriate pileup filter the first problem
can be eliminated, while the second one must be kept in consideration when we
set the discrimination threshold for neutrons. During some specific analysis another
important contribution of instabilities from the electronics front-end was found, from
the test it is evidenced that there are some failure in the FPGA integration procedure
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during high rate acquisition. This problem was solved with an appropriate filter that
will be discussed in next Chapter.
4.8 Timing properties
Timing properties of the detectors are important in our application when the system
is used in active interrogation with tagged neutron beams. In this case the associated
alpha particle related to the final state of the neutron emitting reaction D+T is
detected inside the neutron generator providing the emission time of the neutron and
its flight direction, as defined by kinematics. The acceptance of the alpha particle
detector determines the neutron beam spot at a given distance. The detection time
of the neutron induces gamma rays inside the material and allows to determinate
essentially the travel time of the neutron. Under this light the time resolution of
the system defines the depth of the voxel investigated by the neutron beam [5] that,
linked to the geometry of the beam spot, provides the definition of the inspected
volume.
The typical associated particle detector is a YAP scintillator, which presents
very good count rate capability and fast timing properties. The time resolution of
SMANDRA detector was studied by measuring gamma-gamma coincidences with a
22Na source between a YAP crystal and the other 3 detector: NaI(Tl), LaBr3(Ce)
and liquid scintillator. Moreover, to compare the timing data with values reported
in literature and with the results obtained from NIM electronics further studies were
performed with a EJ-228 plastic scintillator instead of YAP detector. Intrinsic time
resolution of a EJ-228 plastic reaches 300-500 ps with a threshold between 0.2 and
1 MeV [71].
In this work, the data analysis will be performed off-line, and it is necessary to
identify the best method to reconstruct time coincidences using the data from the
V1720 flash ADC.
4.8.1 Digital CFTD optimization
The easiest way to produce coincidence is comparing FlashADC timestamp values.
V1720 acquires data at a 250 MHz rate, with an integration bin of 4 ns. In case of
fast detectors with good time resolution (lower than 1 ns) the 4 ns bin width is the
best time resolution we can get using the timestamp information. This coincidence
will be affected from jitter due to different amplitudes of signals: timestamp is
recorded at the beginning of the PreTrigger, generated on a threshold basis and
thus not independent from signal amplitude. Instead, in common Constant Fraction
Discriminators (CFTD) this issue is solved by using the Amplitude and Risetime
Compensated technique (ARC).
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The jitter effect is evident in case of NaI(Tl) scintillator that has a rise time of
more than 100 ns. Time resolution, that we expected to be about 5 ns (according
to previous tests with NIM CFTD), reaches the value of 30 ns [FWHM] as reported
in Fig. 4.22. Here, data of gamma-gamma coincidences with 22Na between NaI(Tl)
and a YAP scintillator are reported when is used the timestamp information.
Figure 4.22: Gamma-gamma coincidence peak between NaI(Tl) and YAP using timestamps
Fast detectors (like LaBr3(Ce)) have shorter rise times, and the spread induced
by threshold is smaller. Comparing timestamps of LaBr3(Ce) and YAP detector we
obtained a time resolution of 6 ns [FWHM]. The correlation is reported in Fig. 4.23.
In order to improve time reconstruction performance we abandoned the times-
tamps and analyzed directly the digitized signal, looking for a fixed reference point
indipendent from the amplitude. The rise time is independent from signal ampli-
tude and from the particular interaction point inside the scintillator volume both in
organic and inorganic scintillators. Hence, to realize a simple software CFTD it is
enough to calculate the reference time from a threshold that is a constant fraction of
the maximum signal. After that, we are able to evaluate the actual time resolution
of our detectors.
In Fig. 4.24 are reported gamma-gamma coincidence peaks obtained with the
22Na source, with LaBr3(Ce) and NaI(Tl) detectors in coincidence with the YAP
fast scintillator. The width of the peak related to NaI(Tl) narrowed compared to
Fig. 4.22; time resolution is now 7.5 ns [FWHM], while LaBr3(Ce) presents a value
similar to previous measurements. Further improvements in time resolution need
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Figure 4.23: Gamma-gamma coincidence peak between LaBr3(Ce) and YAP using timestamps
Figure 4.24: Gamma-gamma coincidences with variable threshold adjustment. On the left side
result for NaI(Tl) detector, on the right side LaBr3(Ce).
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the signal to be interpolated to lower the uncertainty interval under the limit (the
bin width) of 4 ns. We compared three different methods for calculating thresholds
at a constant fraction of maximum:
• linear fit of the rising part,
• polynomial fit of rising edge,
• analytical calculations.
Another possibility is the implementation of a virtual Constant Fraction Tim-
ing Discriminator as described in [72]. For each of these methods the result were
evalueted in term of timing resolution but also in the associated computional time,
fundamental for a possible online analysis.
The shape of the digitized signal for the 511 keV full energy peak in the LaBr3(Ce)
spectrum measured with the V1720 digitizer is shown in Fig. 4.25 compared to
the signal measured with a Tektronix Digital Oscilloscope (TDS2014B 100 MHz,
1. GS/s). The Digital Oscilloscope signal is obtained as the average of 128 pulses
above the trigger level. A typical waveform for the fast plastic EJ-228 is also reported
derived as an average pulse close to the Compton Edge of the 511 keV transition.
Figure 4.25: Histogram of the pulse height versus time of the LaBr3(Ce) detector (right panel)
and EJ-228 plastic scintillator (left panel) measured with the V1720 digitizer. The
continuous line is the result of a measure with a Tektronix Digital Oscilloscope
Linear fit of the rising part
The first method consists of a linear fit of the central portion of the signal rising part,
taking as a time reference a threshold corresponding to 50% of the signal amplitude.
This simple method works fairly well if the rising times are long enough (as in
the case of NaI(Tl)) so that several points are avaible for the fit. On the contrary,
it not works well with fast signals, like liquid scintillators or the YAP. With these
detectors, the rising part of the signals is concentrated over 3 or 4 bins, dramatically
reducing the statistic and making the fit procedure very unstable. Fig. 4.26 reports
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Figure 4.26: Fast signals with very short rising time
two example of fast signals that will produce unstable timing. We can see that
the two signals are very similar, but a slight difference in trigger results in a very
different profile of the 4 bins of rising ramp due to digitalization resolution, and so
a linear fit will produce two different results starting from near the same pulse.
Time resolution achievable with this method is about 8 ns [FWHM] (NaI(Tl) vs.
YAP) and 2 ns [FWHM] (LaBr3(Ce) vs. YAP).
Polynomial fit of the rising edge
In a second time, we analyzed the possibility to interpolate with a polynomial func-
tion the whole rising edge of the signal, together with some descending point after
the maximum. After having determined the function, it is simple to deduce a time
reference from a given threshold simply using the inverse function, or trying several
time values inside an iterative process. This procedure is the most accurate, but is
also very time-consuming from a computational point of view.
The application of this algorithm to download data from the digitizer results
in the resolutions of 1.54 ns and 6.50 ns [FWHM] respectively for coincidences of
LaBr3(Ce) versus YAP and NaI(Tl) versus YAP.
Fitting the 3 upper points of the pulse peak with a parabolic function improves
final resolution, reducing it up to 20 ps in case of LaBr3(Ce) and 50 for NaI(Tl),
anyway, computational time would increase by a further 15%.
Analytical calculations
The third method looks at a solution without any fit procedures that increase con-
siderably the computional time. For a given signal (see Fig. 4.25), we calculate the
lowest value of the signal corresponding to the maximum in amplitude, and divide
this value by two (thus setting a threshold of 50%). Then we search for the two
closest bins to this value, interpolate the straight line passing by these two points,
reverse it, and finally calculate the time corresponding to the 50% given threshold.
The time resolution obtained with this third method correspond to 1.58 e 6.54 ns
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[FWHM] respectively for LaBr3(Ce) andNaI(Tl) detectors. There is a little wors-
ening in resolution (about 2% with respect to method 2) totally negligible in our
application.
Virtual CFTD
As in common CFTD circuitry, each signal is split in two parts: one signal is delayed
by a quantity D and the other is inverted and attenuated using the fraction F. Finally
the two signals are summed, originating a bipolar signal that provides the timing
information at the zero crossing point.
CF [k] = F · samples[k]− samples[k −D]
In our process the zero crossing value is determined by linear interpolation between
the two data points close to the zero baseline. Fig. 4.27 shows an example of a
virtual CFD signal (continuous line) compared to the input one (dotted line).
Figure 4.27: Super imposition of the input signal from the detector (dotted line) and the virtual
CFD trace (continuous line).
For each detector the parameter F and D is optimized by scanning a range of
possible values. Typically, the delay has a value slightly larger than the signal
rise time. The fraction is inversely proportional to the height of the signal. The
optimized values are reported in Table 4.8 As an example, in Fig. 4.28 is shown the
optimization of delay (D) and fraction (F) parameters for LaBr3(Ce).
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Detector D F
YAP 2 0.7
EJ-228 2 0.7
LaBr3(Ce) 8 0.4
NaI(Tl) 30 0.1
Table 4.8: Optimized parameters for Virtual CFTD. D are reported in bin units.
Figure 4.28: Measured time resolution [FWHM] by varying the LaBr3(Ce) delay D in the virtual
CFT: diamonds fraction F=0.2, squares fraction F=0.4
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The time resolution are 1.06 e 5.1 ns [FWHM] respectively for LaBr3(Ce) and-
NaI(Tl). This method provides the best time resolution obtainable for a digital
CFTD.
Computational time
The needed computational time is fundamental for online implementation of the
virtual CFTD. We search for the best compromize from time resolution and com-
putational time. As an example we list the computing time of the analysis with the
four reported methods on a file containing 600000 events by using a laptop (CPU
intel core i3, 4GB RAM):
• linear fit of the rising edge: 45 seconds,
• polynomial fit of the rising edge: 640 seconds,
• analytical calculation: 10 seconds,
• virtual CFD: 15 seconds.
The fourth method provides a very good timing resolution with a computational
time slightly worse than method 3 (but better than method 1).
4.8.2 Coincidences with SMANDRA detectors
With the same configuration described above (fast detector YAP), we determined
the time resolution of SMANDRA detectors. In Fig. 4.29 we reported the measured
time spectra for all detector and the energy histograms with optimized parameters.
Table 4.9 summarizes the measured of time resolution for the three detectors
with no threshold and with threshold set to 500 keV for both the YAP and SMAN-
DRA detectors compared with result obtained in previous measurements by using
analogical electronics (CFTD Ortec 935).
V1720 V1720
no threshold 500 keV threshold CFTD ORTEC
NaI(Tl) 5.96 ns 5.39 ns 4.2-3.5 ns
LaBr3(Ce) 1.40 ns 1.15 ns 0.90-0.650 ns
NE-213 1.78 ns 1.51 ns
Table 4.9: Resolution comparison between SMANDRA detectors with different electronics
The time resolution obtained with the V1720 card and the simple virtual CFTD
seems to be slightly worse compared to the values achieved by using NIM CFTD.
This is certainly due to the relatively small number of time bins used in digitizing
the signals and, consequently, in managing our virtual CFTD. In our opinion better
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Figure 4.29: Typical timing and energy spectra for SMANDRA detectors. On the upper panel
results from NaI(Tl)-YAP coincidences: left side timing spectra, center NaI(Tl) energy
histogram and right side YAP energy spectra. Center panel LaBr3(Ce) detector and
bottom panel result from NE-213 liquid scintillator.
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results might be obtained by interpolating the zero crossing region with a polynomial
function and using faster digitizers. This would be paid in terms of computing time
needed to process the data sets. For SMANDRA application the time resolution
obtained in this study is sufficiently good: a time resolution of ∆t = 0.8 ns [FWHM]
reflects in about 4 cm depth for the inspected voxel for 14 MeV tagged neutrons.
Voxel depths of the order of 10 cm are a normal choice to ensure the required
statistical accuracy in the gamma ray spectra compatible with acceptable inspection
times [73].
4.8.3 Further improvements in timing optimization
The optimal working condition of virtual CFTD is the signal obtained with a rise
time of 4-5 bin in order to get a good determination of zero crossing. For very fast
signals (as example in case of EJ-228) the rise time is concentrated in one or two
bin and this introduces systematic errors in the achievable time resolution. Fig 4.30
shows the spectrum of coincidence between two EJ-228 produced by virtual CFTD.
The double peaks disappears for detectors with larger rise-time as the LaBr3(Ce).
The same happen for signal selected in the data analysis with a rise time character-
ized by a fixed number of time bins.
Figure 4.30: Coincidence spectra for two EJ-228. The sistematic errors caused by the reduced
number of bin in the sample digitization produces a double peak in the timing spectra.
To overcome this problem there are two solutions. The first consists in increasing
the rise time of the signal through a capacitor, the second one consists in using a
faster FlashADC.
The experimental setup was performed by replacing two detectors EJ-228 40
cm away each from the other. It was recorded gamma-gamma coincidence with a
source of 22Na, centrally located. For each run we saved two spectra: the first in
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selftrigger mode in order to verify the stability of energy calibration, the second in
coincidence to calculate time resolution between the two detectors. We will call the
two detectors Left and Right, powered at 1800 V and 1750 V respectively, to have
similar gain in pulse heigth spectra. The voltage is close to the reference values of
the photomultiplier.
Increasing rising edge with capacitor
The introduction of a capacitor (parallel-connected) in the input circuit of the
FlashADC produces an increase of the rising time of the signal proportional to
the capacitance. For each capacitor, the CFTD parameters (F and D) need to be
optimized. The time resolution is calculated as the RMS of the spectrum because
the presence of the double peak makes impossible to perform any gaussian fit. If
there is no systematic error that causes the double peak, the distribution will be
Gaussian and the RMS of the spectra will coincide with the σ of the distribution.
Fig 4.31 shows RMS: data are reported versus the capacitance as obtained with
optimized CFTD parameters.
Figure 4.31: RMS (ns) as a function of the capacitance. The best resolution is obtained with a
capacitor of 330 pF.
There is a minimum between 220 and 390 pF with a RMS value of about 0.35 ns.
At higher capacity value, the rising time of the signal becomes very long and then
the time resolution tends to slowly rise. The results reported in Fig 4.31 suggest
that there is an optimal value for the rise time of the signal that produces the best
temporal resolution with the V1720 digitizer. To understand what is the optimal
lenght of the rise time, we are going to associate to each value of the capacity the
average number of bins in the rising part of the signal. Fig 4.32 shows the correlation
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bewteen the condensator’s capacity and the number of bin in the rise front of the
signal.
Figure 4.32: Lenght of the rising edge of the signal versus condensator’s capacity
It is evidente a non-linear dependency with a drop over 400 pF. To better unde-
stand this trend we compare the various signals to see how the introduction of the
capacitor affects the shape of the pulse. The “reference” scope is calculated by the
average of all pulse inverted and appropriately normalized to an unitary intergral.
Fig 4.33 reports the “reference” scope of four representative capacitor from 0 to 680
pF and the comparison between the two values where is the discontinuity.
Figure 4.33: In the left panel the “reference” scope for four different capacitor, in the right panel a
focus on two particular values.
It is evidente that the introduction of a capacitor acting as a RC filter by in-
creasing the duration of the signal and decreasing its amplitude. Higher is the value
of the capacitor and greater is the number of bins in the signal. The modification
of the signal shape partially precludes the possibility of performing a good Pulse
Shape Discrimination to distinguish between neutron/gamma ray. Looking to the
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Capacity (pF) F D Det Left Det Rifght
0 0.7 2 1.91 1.85
100 0.5 3 2.86 2.82
150 0.5 3 3.24 3.13
180 0.4 3 3.31 3.28
220 0.4 3 3.47 3.42
330 0.2 4 4.11 4.03
390 0.2 4 4.37 4.32
470 0.3 5 4.01 3.89
560 0.3 4 4.14 4.07
680 0.2 4 4.47 4.45
Table 4.10: Optimized CFTP parameters and number of bins in the rising edge of the two detectors.
right panel of Fig 4.33, we can undestood the reason of the discontinuity in Fig 4.32.
By increasing the value of the capacitor from 390 to 470 pF the signal undergoes a
change different than expected. Most likely over a certain value the capacitor starts
to modify the tail more than the rest of the signal causing this drop.
Another interesting point is the dependence of the temporal resolution respect to
the number of bins in the rising edge of the signals reported in fig 4.34. The optimal
Figure 4.34: Time resolution versus the number of bins in the rising edge of the signal
number of bin, to minimize the time resolution, is equal to 4. In this configuration
we need a capacitor of 330pF to shape the EJ-228 signal in order to obtain an
average rising front of 4 bins. For completeness we reporte in Table 4.10 the values
of optimized CFTD parameters and the number of bins in the average rising edge
for each used capacitor.
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High voltage dependence
The ratio energy/channel increases with the capacitance of the detector. It is im-
portant to control this increase to set properly threshold and energy calibration.
Using 22Na source we are able to verify that the decrease of the gain in the energy
spectrum is about 10% between the maximum value of 680pF and the first spectrum
without capacitor, while the value of the energy resolution remains almost constant.
To compensate the loss of gain we tried to increase the operating voltage of the
photomultiplier to see if there is an improvement in the time resolution. In this
test the capacity was set at the value of 330 pF. The results do not show significant
improvements, the RMS remains equal to the minimum value found earlier (0.35 ns)
within errors and the gain increases of 40% for a voltage of 1900 V. The increase of
voltage does not lead to substantial improvements in the temporal resolution.
V1751 measurements
The V1751 is a 1GS/s flashADC of the same family of V1720. The higher sampling
rate allows to have a width of the integration bin of 1 ns and consequently do not
require any additional capacitors to analyze the rise time of the signal in case of
fast detector. The length of the rise time has an average value of 4.5 bin that is
in agreement with the previous tests performed with V1720 and capacitor. With
no threshold (about 50 keV) we obtained a time resolution of 0.27 ns and setting a
threshold of 100 keV the resolution decreases to 0.20 ns. With the same threshold
the V1720 digitizers plus a 330 pF capacitor obtains a RMS of 0.34 ns with an
worsening of 30% in time resolution.
Furthermore using a 60Co source it is possible to study the correlation between
the time resolution and the energy threshold up to the value of 700 keV. Figure
4.35 compares the results of V1751 digitizer in terms of time resolution [FWHM]
with those obtained by the same detectors with standard NIM electronic. It is clear
that the time resolution obtained with digitizer is very close to that obtainable with
standard NIM electronics altough the possible loss of resolution in digitizing the
signal. Most likely refining the CFTD software the results would be slightly better.
Furthemore it is interesting to note that time resolution of digitizer is less sensitive to
the increase of the threshold than standard NIM electronic. The filter on the signal’s
shape made by digitizier cleans a lot of noise that in analog electronics inevitably
ends in CFTD.
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Figure 4.35: Comparison of time resolution [FWHM] versus threshold energy for V1751 digitized
and standard NIM electronic.
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Chapter 5
Sensitivity tests
5.1 Standards
Standards play an important role in the characterization of an inspection system.
They may establish size or shape or capacity of a given device and specify the
required performances. They also define the test procedures so that there is no
misunderstanding among those quoting a given system performance.
International Standards are produced by Organizations like the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International Organization for Standard-
ization (ISO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). IEC covers
electrotechnology and related conformity assessment, ITU covers telecommunica-
tions and ISO covers nearly all other technical fields, a number of service sectors,
management systems and conformity assessments.
In addition there are several other Institutes that serve as national coordinator
for standards, for example the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is the
official U.S. representative for the ISO and IEC.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recently published the
first techinal guidance: Technical and Functional Specifications for Border Monitor-
ing Equipment [74] originated from the results of the Illicit Trafficking Radiation
Detection Assessment Programme (ITRAP) completed in 2000.
For our purpose we focus on three particular standards that provide rules and
guidelines to characterize radiation monitoring systems. Two of them are defined
by IEC, the third one is the Technical Guidance published by IAEA.
5.1.1 IEC standard
IEC (International Electro-technical Commission) defines a set of standard for detec-
tion systems dedicated to the monitoring of ionizing radiation in various operational
fields. Two of them are of particular interest for our project:
1. IEC 62244 Radiation protection instrumentation - Installed radiation moni-
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tors for the detection of radioactive and special nuclear materials at national
borders,
2. IEC 62327 Hand-Held instruments for the detection and identification of ra-
dionuclides and additionally for the indication of ambient dose equivalent rate
from photon radiation.
As far as we know, there is no specific IEC documents for mobile systems such
as SMANDRA.
The main difference between the two standards is that hand-held devices are
required to detect not only the presence of a radiation source, but also to be able
to identify it. From this point of view, SMANDRA performances can be directly
compared to IEC62327 requirements as for gamma and neutron sensitivity, further
IEC62244 parameters can be considered in case of evaluating the possible use of
SMANDRA technology in portal installations.
Briefly, IEC IEC62327 rules require:
• in case of gamma rays, to rise an alarm within 3 seconds if radiation levels
exceed threshold, and to identify the source in 1-2 minutes for a given dose of
0.5 µSv/h on the front face of the detector,
• in case of neutrons, to get an alarm within 10 seconds in presence of a 252Cf
source that produces a dose of 3 µSv/h on the detector (corresponding to a
source emitting 2 · 104 neutrons/s placed at a distance of 25 cm).
According to IEC, a criterion for the acceptability of an instrument is a Proba-
bility of Detection PD greater than 90% at a Confidence Level of 95% (PD and CL
are defined in the next section).
5.1.2 IAEA Technical guidance
The Technical Guidance prepared by IAEA provides technical and functional re-
quirements for equipment used at international borders for the interdiction of illicit
nuclear and radiological threats.
The document is addressed to all instruments used by FLOs (Front Line Officers)
and to experts divided into the following types:
• fixed radiation portal monitors (RPMs), with a subcategory of Spectrometric
Radiation Portal Monitors (SRPMs), featuring real-time radionuclide identifi-
cation,
• personal radiation detectors (PRDs),
• hand-held radionuclide identification devices (RIDs),
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• hand-held neutron search devices (NSDs),
• portable radiation scanners (PRSs).
We are interested in particular to RIDs, NSDs hand-held systems and Portable
radiation scanners (PRSs). Hand-held systems are used to detect, localize, and
identify radioactive and nuclear material, as well as provide gamma dose rate mea-
surement to ensure radiation safety during the localization and identification process.
RIDs is conceived as an instrument usable in conjunction with present monitoring
devices such as PRDs. They are used for detection in targeted search situations to
give dose rate, type of radiation (neutron or γ-ray) and identification of the individ-
ual isotopes.
PRSs are designed mainly for covert detection of unauthorized or undeclared
activities but are also useful in specific situations where the usage of fixed portals
or hand-held systems are not possible. For example, they may be used aboard large
vessels, such as airplanes or ships, at public/urban areas and at borders without
law-enforcement control. This instrument has the same main functions of detection
and identification as an RIDs but its design is significantly different because they
are using large detectors (for the identification of weaker sources), the presence
of a neutron detector, a real-time/automatic identification mode and flexibility for
changing backgrounds (e.g., for mobile use).
The common requirements for these systems are the following:
• false Alarm Rate (FAR) for either gamma rays or neutrons during operation.
It shall not be more than one per hour,
• probability of detection of 90% with a confidence level of 95%,
• detection of radioactive material that produces a dose rate of 0.05µSv/h in
the point of closest approach to the instrument and moves with a speed of 0.5
m/s. ,
• energy range for γ-ray from 50 keV to 1.33 MeV.
In particular for hand-held systems:
• time for radionuclide identification less than 100 seconds at the exposure rate
of 0.05 µSv/h,
• trigger a neutron alarm within 5 seconds with a 252Cf source of 2.0 · 104 n/s
placed at 0.20 m from the instrument[75].
For portable radiation scanners the following requirements are needed:
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• time for radionuclide identification less than 60 seconds at the exposure rate
of 0.05 µSv/h,
• detection of a neutron source that emits 1.2 · 104 neutrons/s and moves with
a speed of 0.5 m/s at a distance of closest approach between the source and a
PRS of one meter.
5.2 Statistical definitions
The evaluation of a system whose aim is to detect radioisotopic sources or SMN
shall satisfy strict test protocols. The necessary statistical background has recently
revised in [76].
In particular it is requested that the instrument has a certain value of PD (Prob-
ability of Detection) to reduce as much as possible the PFA (Probability of False
Alarm). These two values must be defined and experimentally testified for a certain
Confidence Level (CL). In the next paragraphs we will analyze the meaning of these
terms.
First of all, we define the Binomial Discrete Density Function b(m,n, p) that is
the basis of following definitions:
b(m,n, p) = (Pr(BIN(n, p)) = m) =
n!
m!(n−m)!p
m(1− p)n−m
where m = 0.1, . . . , n is the number of successful events in the search for hidden
materials in n independent attempts with p = PD (see [77]). PD is here intended
as the probability to succeed in finding hidden sources.
Cumulative function CL(m,n, PD), for a given series of n measurements and a
number m of successes with a fixed PD, is defined as:
CL(m,n, PD) =
m−1∑
j=0
b(j, n, PD)
with x = 0.1, . . . n, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, Binomial Cumulative Distribution Function
(BINCDF ) can also be defined as follows:
BINCDF (x, n, p) = Pr(BIN(n, p) ≤ x) = sumxk=0 (nk) pk(1− p)n−k
To find the maximum number of identification mc with a given PD and a desired
CL we must reverse the upper equation:
BINCDF (mc − 1, n, PD) ≥ CL
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BINCDF is a discrete step-function in the x variable, thus it does not have a
continuous inverse function. The value mc must be intended as the first integer for
which BINCDF (mc− 1, n, PD) is greater than CL.
mc = INV BINCDF (CL, n, PD) + 1
This reverse function can be found ready-to-use inside statistical function of
many spreadsheet, eventually under other names. Some of them do not return the
maximum number of positive identification, instead they calculate the maximum
number of failures (Mc); in this case we speak of Probability of False Alarm (PFA).
When PD = 1− PFA the two quantities are connected by a simple formula:
mc +MC = n
At this point we calculate the maximum acceptable number of wrong results
for a given PD or PFA with a fixed CL. Standards require a Confidence Level of
95%, Table 5.1 contains the maximum number of failures for various PD/PFA and
different values of the attempts numbern.
PD 0.9 0.8 0.7
PFA 0.1 0.2 0.3
n=2 * * *
n=3 * * *
n=4 * * *
n=5 * * *
n=6 * * *
n=7 * * *
n=8 * * *
n=9 * * 0
n=10 * * 0
n=11 * * 0
n=12 * * 0
n=15 * 0 1
n=20 * 0 2
n=25 * 1 3
n=30 0 2 4
n=40 0 3 6
n=50 1 5 9
n=60 1 6 11
Table 5.1: Maximum number of failures for various PD/PFA and n attempts
Working with a PD of 90% and at a CL of 95% we need at least 29 consecutive
positive tests to satisfy requirements. There is a way of evaluating directly the
required number of consecutive positive results as a function of CL and PD.
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a =
log(CL)
log(PD)
The number of attempts will be the smaller integer greater than a. Fig. 5.1
shows the dependance of a function of PD for different values of CL.
Figure 5.1: Number of attempts as function of PD and CL
5.3 Definition of Detection Probability
Radioactive decay follows Poisson statistics, so we must take it into account in
defining the thresholds. Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution
that expresses the probability for n events to be realized in a given time, providing
that their medium number is λ. This distribution is also known as “rare event’s
law”; it is defined as:
P (n) = e−λ
λn
n!
for any n belonging to naturals. If we assume that the detector produces a
normal distribution of responses, the presence/absence of a particular threat might
be expected to produce two normal distributions [78] (see Fig 5.2).
Using components defined in Fig. 5.2, a variety of different performance metrics
have been established, the most well-known are summarised in Table 5.2. One of
the most used is the Detection Probability (PD), already introducted in Section 5.2.
This component represents the ability of a test to correctly identify target presence,
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Figure 5.2: In the upper panel the confusion matrix and in the lower panel the associated decision
distributions with respect to detection signal strength [78]
given that a target is actually present. A second key performance metric is the False
Alarm Rate, that represents the rate at which items are incorrectly labelled as a
threat when they are in fact benign.
Quantity Definition
Detection probability, true positive rate TP/(TP + FN)
True negative rate (TNR) TN/(FP + TN)
False alarm rate or false positive rate FP/(FP + TN)
Table 5.2: A selection of common quantities derived from the confusion matrix.
Note that the threshold in Fig. 5.2 is placed at the point sometimes referred as
the optimal value. Optimal means that misclassification of items (False Positive and
False Negatives) is minimized. However, in our as well as in many other applications
this would be a poor choice of decision threshold: it may be considered better to
shift the threshold such that the number of false positive is minimized and true
positive maximized according to the requirements of PD and FAR.
5.3.1 Threshold
Once we know the average number of background events (λ), it is possible to set a
threshold in accordance with standards. For example, the IAEA standars requires
that there is no more than one false positive alarm per hour. If the sampling time is 3
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seconds this means that FP is the 0.083% of the total background events (TN+FP ).
Therefore the threshold must be set at 99.917% of the total integral of Poisson
distribution. The integral of the Poisson distribution is defined as:
I =
Γ(k + 1, λ)
k!
where Γ(x, y) is the incomplete gamma function and k belongs to natural positive
number. When I > 1− PFA the first integer k is set as threshold.
In Fig. 5.3 is reported Poisson distribution and integral for various λ.
Figure 5.3: In the left panel the Poisson Distribution, in the right panel the Cumulative distribute
function (CFD). Curves for different value of λ are shown.
5.4 Neutron Sensibility Tests
IEC62327 standard for hand-held instruments requires the emission of an alarm
within 10 s of measurement. We started with the acquisition of 10 spectra, each
with a duration of 10 seconds, using PSD on NE-213 detector to count the number
of neutron events. In a first step we determined the best cut in energy domain cor-
responding to minimum PFA, comparing 10 different background counting windows
from 200 to 1400 keVee with steps of 200, and calculating the number of neutron
events above each of these thresholds.
From these background acquisitions we derived the average neutron number over
all the runs and calculated the correspondent Poisson function P(n). Then, when
the integral of P (n) overcomes 90% of total, the corresponding number of events is
taken as threshold.
In Table 5.3 we report the number of neutron events recorded in the first 10
acquisitions with 10 different energy thresholds. AVG refers to average values for
each threshold, and THR is the alarm threshold (PFA = 10%).
We see that considering the energy cut at 200 keVee the alarm threshold obtained
counts 8 events while the number of neutrons measured for all the ten background
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Cut (keVee) 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Run 1 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Run 2 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Run 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Run 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Run 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Run 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Run 7 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Run 8 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Run 9 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Run 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AVG 4,4 0,7 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
THR 8 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 5.3: Neutron events with different thresholds
runs is under this value: hence we have 0 false alarms (FA). Raising the threshold
to 400 keVee it is verified the presence of 1 FA, as for higher values of energy cut.
In a second step the Californium source (104 neutron/s) was placed at the dis-
tance of 100, 120 and 140 cm to experimentally determine the PD of our system.
Table 5.4 reports the number of the alarms at each distance for all the ten energy
threshold, considering 10 s acquisition repeated 10 times.
Cut (keVee) 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
100 cm 10 10 7 9 8 5 4 4 3 2
120 cm 10 10 6 7 4 2 0 0 0 0
140 cm 10 9 7 6 4 4 2 1 1 1
Table 5.4: Number of alarms. For details see the text.
Only with the lowest cut (200 keVee) we have 10 consecutive successes at every
distance.
Working with a PD of 90%, to testify that out CL matches the value of 95% as
required by the standards, we must run a test with at least 29 consecutive detections.
Consequently the source was placed 120 cm far from the detector, and we acquired 30
runs with the source and 30 runs of background with higher statistic were acquired.
Table 5.5 lists the results for the first 3 cuts in energy.
The results gave the final confirmation that the best energy cut is 200 keVee,
and that for that value our system has a PD of 90% at a Confidence Level of 95%
with a 104 n/s source placed at 120 cm from the detector.
Considering that IEC62327 standard for hand-held devices requires such perfor-
mance with more intense source placed at a distance of only 25 cm from the detector,
we can reasonably conclude that the neutronic part of SMANDRA not only satisfies
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Cut (keVee) 200 400 600
Count threshold 9 3 1
FA background 0 out of 30 1 out of 30 9 out of 30
Positive alarms,
source in position 30 out of 30 29 out of 30 29 out of 30
Table 5.5: Positive alarms
IEC62327 requirements, but also that our system presents a sensitivity about 60
times greater that required in case of an hand-held instruments.
5.5 Gamma Sensibility Tests
IEC62327 standard requires an alarm within 3 seconds of acquisition in presence of
a gamma-ray emission in addition to the natural background.
To check the SMANDRA sensitivity to gamma rays we considered both NaI(Tl)
and LaBr3(Ce) detectors. We computed the total integral of gamma spectra, since
we are interested in having an alarm in presence of any kind of radioactive source.
The gamma-ray performance must be documented in an energy range from 59 to
1330 keV, corresponding to the characteristic energies of 241Am and 60Co, respec-
tively.
As in the case of neutrons, we performed 30 background acquisitions with NaI(Tl)
and LaBr3(Ce) detectors to calculate the alarm thresholds, and 30 more acquisition
with various gamma sources placed at different distances from the detectors.
First measurement has been carried on with a 60Co source that has an activity of
400 kBq, providing a dose of 0.144 µSv/h at the distance of 1 m. IEC62327 standard
requires to identify any gamma source that increases the background dose of 0.5
µS/h, given that at 0.5 m we are over the alarm threshold. We placed the source
at the maximum distance allowed by the lab room: 2.71 m. In these conditions the
source provided a dose of 0.02 µSv/h on the front face of the detector.
The test has been repeated with a 241Am source with an equivalent dose of 2
orders of magnitude smaller than 60Co. We put the source 80 cm far from the
scintillators. At this distance it provided a dose of 2.5 nSv/h.
Table 5.6 shows the results for the alarm tests performed by using the same
procedures as the one described before for the neutrons.
For both NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce) detector IEC62372 standards are satisfied with
90% of PD at 95% CL. Also in this case our system has a better performance
compared to requirements, as it provides the same PD for much smaller radiation
dose rates.
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Detector NaI(Tl) LaBr3(Ce)
Threshold (events in 3 s) 2527 757
FA on background 0 out of 30 2 out of 30
Alarms with 60Co at 271 cm 30 out of 30 30 out of 30
Alarms with 241Am at 80 cm 30 out of 30 29 su 30
Table 5.6: Results of the alarm tests
5.6 Source identification
5.6.1 Identification process
The identification of a radioactive source from a single gamma spectrum is a complex
problem, and many different algorithms have been studied. The idea underlying all
these solutions consists in the comparison of the spectrum with one or more other
spectra of known sources or a combination of them.
Many factors contribute to the complexity of the task, and each peak could be
evaluated under different parameters with the following related issues:
• energy: different sources can present similar peaks, identical within the limits
of resolution; furthermore, calibration can be not perfectly linear,
• resolution: even in state-of-the-art detectors, resolution is a function of energy
and may be affected from other dependencies,
• intensity: sources can be shielded by materials resulting in one energy-dependent
attenuator; this makes nearly impossible the use of criteria based on relative
intensities.
In this work a simple model has been used, based only on energies and resolutions.
It will be a working basis for future upgrade of the software.
The first step consists in the creation of a small database of sources, each with
the number of expected peaks and their energies (in keV). Feasible example can
be 22Na (511, 1274.5), 60Co (1173, 1332), 137Cs (661.7) and the internal activity of
LaBr3(Ce) (1460). This set can be extended in future.
The actual analysis of a spectrum starts with the Compton Background subtrac-
tion procedure that is part of ROOT analysis functions. In Fig. 5.4 the red line
shows a calibrated spectrum of 22Na source as acquired from the digitizer using the
NaI(Tl) detector, whereas the black line shows the same spectrum after automatic
Compton subtraction.
Next step is the application of an algorithm for peak identification (see Fig. 5.4)
through a gaussian fit. From this, energy and sigma values that allows to obtain
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Figure 5.4: Red line is the raw spectrum acquired from NaI(Tl) detector with a 22Na, black line
shows the same spectrum after automatic compton subtraction
the percent energy resolution for each peak. Such parameters are saved, as in the
example shown below:
Found 2 peaks:
1) Mean: 1158.634888 Sigma: 25.479431
Res.: 4.914968% Res(E): 4.759285%
2) Mean: 1315.373779 Sigma: 27.046551
Res.: 4.595579% Res(E): 4.466737%
Res(E) is the predicted resolution that is function of the detector NaI(Tl) or
LaBr3(Ce) and gamma ray energy, obtained in first approximation by scaling as
K√
E
, where E is the energy and K is a parameter empirically determined.
Peaks with resolution lower than predicted or larger more than a factor 2 are
rejected. The value of 2 has been proved to be a good compromise between the need
of filtering peaks with poor resolution and the possibility that - for many reason -
the actual resolution can be often larger than expected. Further improvements in
the peak rejection criteria are left for the future.
Finally, the algorithm starts a loop over known sources from the database, trying
to find the nearest detected peak for each expected energy. Sources are classified by
two parameters: the number of peaks matched, and the S-index, that is the average
absolute distance from expected energies, normalized to sigma units:
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Figure 5.5: Calibrated spectrum of 60Co source, LaBr3(Ce) with internal activity
Found 2 peaks:
1) Mean: 1158.634888 Sigma: 25.479431
Res.: 4.914968% Res(E): 4.759285%
2) Mean: 1315.373779 Sigma: 27.046551
Res.: 4.595579% Res(E): 4.466737%
Nearest peak to 1173 is 1158 with sigma 25.479431
Nearest peak to 1332 is 1315 with sigma 27.046551
*** Source: 60Co Matches: 2/2 S-Index: 0.589259
Continuing in our example, we see that the algorithm tried to find 60Co energy
peaks in the measured spectrum. 60Co presents two characteristic peaks very near
each other, and both match (2/2) with an average distance of 0.58 sigma units.
For every source, if a peak doesn’t match within 3 sigma units, it is not counted.
If a source is missing a match for more than 25% of expected peaks, it is marked as
“not found”.
At present time, this simple but automated procedure is able to identify 22Na,
60Co, 137Cs, the internal activity peak of LaBr3(Ce) and the natural background; if
we launch the program on a LaBr3(Ce) spectrum of the
60Co source (see Fig. 5.5)
we correctly obtain:
Found 3 peaks:
1) M: 1168.402222 S: 15.087454 R: 2.886032% R(E): 2.217548%
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2) M: 1326.356567 S: 14.017448 R: 2.362034% R(E): 2.081321%
3) M: 1458.046875 S: 21.800505 R: 3.341739% R(E): 1.985105%
Nearest peak to 1173 is 1168 with sigma 15.087454
Nearest peak to 1332 is 1326 with sigma 14.017448
*** Source: 60Co Matches: 2/2 S-Index: 0.353671
Nearest peak to 1460 is 1458 with sigma 21.800505
*** Source: K/LaBr Matches: 1/1 S-Index: 0.089591
5.6.2 Test with SMANDRA detectors
In the final release of the program, the presence of a gamma alarm generated from
NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce) is supposed to start another acquisition, lasting 1 or 2 min-
utes (as requested from IEC standard) for the automatic identification of the ra-
dioisotope.
A first series of tests have made in the above mentioned geometrical conditions
(60Co source at 271 cm and 241Am at 80 cm) and also using a 400 kBq 137Cs sourced
placed at 271 cm.
The procedure was the following: we acquired 5 spectra for every source and 5
background spectra, every run being 1 minute long. Automatic software performed
the subtraction of the n-th background from the n-th spectrum. The 15 background-
subtracted spectra (5 per source) are automatically processed with the three steps
below:
a) energy calibration,
b) subtraction of the continous part of the spectrum,
c) peak search and gaussian fit.
The result is a list of peaks identified by energy, integral and resolution. The
resolution information is used to reject possible false-identification of the algorithm
(structures clearly too large to correspond to a radioactive decay). Details on the
procedure are in Section 5.6.1.
Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 show example of automatic peak identification on spec-
trum taken with NaI(Tl) and Cs, Co, Am sources. Red triangles mark identified
peaks. We note that in case of Cs and Am the program identifies only characteristic
transition, while in the Co spectrum also other structures are marked; considering
that resolution is larger and integral smaller than “normal” peaks, they can easily
be identified and rejected.
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Figure 5.6: 137Cs spectrum after the automatic analysis
Figure 5.7: 60Co spectrum after the automatic analysis
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Figure 5.8: 241Am spectrum after the automatic analysis
Results are summarized in Table 5.7.
Source Eγ (keV) Measured Eγ (keV) Measured Res (%)
241Am 59 47.23± 0.04 24.32± 1.05
137Cs 661 648.1± 1.4 6.72± 0.56
60Co 1170 1144.0± 1.8 5.41± 0.15
1330 1299.8± 1.4 4.77± 0.24
Table 5.7: Results of the source identification tests
Reported uncertainties refer to the deviation from the average evaluated for the
5 measurements. Apart from systematic shifts due to calibration, we see that the
precision in determining the centroids is very good, while the resolution is affected
from a typical error of 5%. These two parameters determine uncertainty of the
integral, which is always under 7% (worst case with Cesium source).
As a conclusion, it seem that system performances did reach the targets. Using
NaI(Tl), that is bigger than LaBr3(Ce) and has a greater efficiency, SMANDRA
can generate an alarm at greater distances (or lower doses) as requested by the IEC
standard, and can also identify the sources with a 1 minute acquisition.
Chapter 6
Measurement at JRC (Ispra)
The results reported in this Chapter have been obtained by using calibration gamma
ray-sources and neutron sources (252Cf and AmBe) located inside the INFN-LNL
whereas Special Nuclear Material has been made available by the PERLA Labora-
tory at JRC Ispra where the tests were performed.
In Table 6.1 we report the SNM samples used in our tests.
SNM Code Weight (g) Enrichment
Plutonium CBNM61 6.6 62,5% in 239Pu
CBNM70 6.7 73,3% in 239Pu
CBNM84 6.7 84,4% in 239Pu
CBNM93 6.6 93,4% in 239Pu
MOX ENEA01 168.1 Pu 66,4% in 239Pu
Uranium LU102 388 1,0% in 235U
UP899S 46,4 89,9% in 235U
LU25 2500 2,5% in 235U
LU44 2500 4,4 in 235U
Table 6.1: Special Nuclear Material samples used at the PERLA laboratory.
It is interesting to note that the 6 g Pu samples CBNMxx are expected to
emit neutrons at the rate of 0.5-3 kcps depending on the isotopic composition, the
estimate of the nominal gamma emission being more difficult due to the absorption
of the metallic enclosure of the sample.
6.1 Detection in Passive Mode
As a first attempt, the detection of SNM samples was explored in passive mode using
the SMANDRA multi-detector box. The sensitivity of the system in detecting weak
gamma ray and neutron sources, as obtained in our Applied Physics Laboratory at
LNL, is reported in Sec. 5. The detection protocol for the SNM test is the following:
a) for each measurement a background run was first performed in order to define
the alarm threshold for neutrons in the NE-213 detector, as well as for gamma
99
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ray in the high efficiency NaI(Tl) scintillator. Alarm thresholds correspond to 3
seconds measuring time;
b) all SNM samples were placed in front of the detector box, shielded by 6 mm of
iron. The distances were adjusted so that the various sources would deliver a
dose of 0.5 µSv/h at the surface of the detector box. This condition was defined
for each sample by use of a Victoreen Model 451P ionization chamber;
c) for all samples, 5 or 10 minutes acquisitions were performed. Events were grouped
offline into 3 s measurements using the time stamps. This process was done in
order to verify the detection probability (PD) at a given confidence level (CL).
Test were performed at PD= 90%, CF= 95% according to the prescriptions of
IEC standards. Specifically, this protocol was defined in accordance with the
prescriptions for hand-held radiometric system reported in [79].
6.1.1 Small Pu samples
The small 6g Pu samples (CBNMxx) produced alarms both for neutrons and for
gamma rays satisfying the required PD. Typical count rates with the sample sources
resulted several times higher than the laboratory background. The measured neu-
tron yield is reported in Fig. 6.1 in terms of counts per gram of plutonium sample
in a minute measurement as a function of 239Pu isotopic abundance (blue squares).
The red line is the expected yield assuming a detection efficiency of about 20% for
the neutron detector after energy windowing.
Gamma rays spectra from the Pu samples have been studied making use of the
superior energy resolution of the LaBr3(Ce)scintillator, needed to disentangle the
complex spectra [80]. Typical results for a 61% enrichment sample are presented in
Fig. 6.2 where the upper panel shows the raw (energy uncalibrated) spectrum for a
10 minute acquisition. The high energy structure is due to the internal activation of
the LaBr3(Ce) scintillator (1440-1470 keV [8]). Our software produces automatically
the calibrated spectrum, subtracting the continuous part of the energy distribution
and producing the spectrum in the lower panel. It is also possible to subtract the
background due to the ambient as well as the internal LaBr3(Ce) radioactivity. Few
gamma ray transitions are visible in this spectrum: the lines at Eγ = 373, 414 and
451 keV that can be attributed to the 239Pu decay and lines at Eγ = 662 and 772
keV deriving from the 241Am decay. Moreover, the Eγ = 208 keV line is due to
the 241Am nucleus as well as to the 237U, another daughter nucleus often in secular
equilibrium with 241Pu. It is also interesting to note that 239Pu has also a transition
at Eγ = 203 keV that can not be resolved with the present system.
The same transitions are found with Pu samples with different isotopics but
the peak ratios are different according with the isotopic composition of the sample.
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Figure 6.1: Measured neutron yield for 6 g calibration Pu samples (blu squares) as a function of
the sample mass percent of the 239Pu isotope relative to total plutonium. The triangle
refers to a very large Pu sample (ENEA01). The red line refers to yield estimate based
on the sample isotopic composition.
Such features are reported in Fig. 6.3 in term of yield of the relevant 239Pu lines
as a function of the sample composition. Fig. 6.4 displays the ratio between the
relevant gamma lines of 239Pu and 241Am as a function of enrichment. Thus, after
the simultaneous gamma and neutron alarms, the gamma ray spectra can be used
to identify the plutonium sample providing as well some rough information about
the isotopic composition, especially in the very high enrichment zone.
6.1.2 MOX sample
Signatures from a larger Pu sample have been studied using the MOX ENEA01. This
is particularly interesting because of the large amount of Pu present in the sample
(170g) mixed with uranium oxides (1011g) and the presence of a 2.5 cm thick Pb
shield around the sealed source container. The sample was positioned in accordance
with prescriptions about dose rate as described above. The sample releases a strong
neutron signature that alarms the system providing the required DP. However, the
normalized neutron yield is lower respect to the ones from 6g samples, as reported
in Fig. 6.1 due to the self absorption inside the material.
The gamma ray emission is also very strong even after the lead shield. The
collected gamma ray spectrum displays clearly the expected 239Pu - 241Am gamma
lines as demonstrated in Fig. 6.5. Consequently, it seems that large Pu samples
could be easily identified also in presence of lead shielding.
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Figure 6.2: Gamma ray spectrum of aCBNM61 at different stages of the data processing.
Figure 6.3: Yield of the relevant 239Pu gamma transitions as a function of the sample composition
(red diamond Eγ = 375 keV; blu square Eγ = 332 keV; yellow triangle Eγ = 413 keV).
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Figure 6.4: Ratio between the relevant 239Pu (Eγ = 375 keV ) and
241Am (Eγ = 375 keV ) gamma
rays as a function of the enrichment of the sample.
Figure 6.5: Gamma ray spectrum from the ENEA01 MOX sample.
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6.1.3 Uranium samples
Uranium samples LU102 and UP899S were used to investigate the response of the
system operated in passive mode to SNM with different neutron/gamma ratios.
The intensity of gamma ray emission from the sample is sufficient to yield an alarm,
whereas neutron emission resulted to be only about twice the laboratory background.
Consequently long measuring times are required in order to get a neutron alarm with
the required confidence level. As far as the gamma ray signatures, measured spectra
are reported in Fig. 6.6. In the high enriched sample (UP899S) the Eγ = 186 keV
transition in 235U is evident, whereas for the low enrichment sample LU102 the two
transitions of 238U at Eγ = 767 and 1001 keV are clear.
Figure 6.6: Gamma ray spectra from UP899S (top) and LU102 (bottom) samples.
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6.1.4 Behaviour with shielding materials
As shown in this Section, the Pu samples produce neutron as well as gamma ray
alarms in the detection system when the dose delivered at the detector surface is
0.5 µSv/h. In the same condition the U samples produce a clear gamma ray alarm
but the neutron emission being too weak. In both cases the LaBr3(Ce) gamma
ray spectra provide hints on the isotopic composition of the sample. It is worth
considering how this information is modified by the presence of shielding materials.
Figure 6.7: Gamma ray yield from 1 g weapon grade plutonium and uranium samples as a function
of the thickness of lead shield (diamond 241Am Eγ = 662 keV; square
239pu Eγ = 414
keV; yellow triangle 235U Eγ = 186 keV; green triangle
238U Eγ = 1001 keV).
The effect of different materials on the neutron emission of a source hidden
in a cargo container is discussed in detail in [12] and we refer to this work for
the attenuation of the neutron signal of a Pu sample. However, it is interesting
to consider in more detail the γ-ray signal from the samples studied in this work
when shielded with heavy metals. This is shown in Fig. 6.7 where the effect of
the attenuation due to lead shielding is detailed for the characteristic gamma rays
emitted from a 1 g source of weapon grade plutonium (93% 293Pu) and uranium
(93% 235Pu). In case of the WGPu, the 239Pu and the 241Am transitions (Eγ = 414
keV and Eγ = 662 keV) still have a yield of about 100 Hz after 2.5 cm of shielding
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making the detection possible at close contact. However, the ratio between the 239Pu
/ 241Am transition is modified from R = 18 with no shield to R = 0.8 with 2.5 cm
lead providing a false hint on the isotopic composition of the sample as shown in Fig.
6.4. Moreover, the photon signature from highly enriched uranium is extremely weak
even after 1 cm lead due to the low energy of the 235U transition and the intrinsic
low yield of the 238U one. Also in this case the lead shield causes a strong change
in the isotopic composition derived from the γ-ray spectrum.
Summarising, the detection of uranium samples in passive mode seems to be
difficult in case the sample is shielded with high Z material that will significantly
attenuate the gamma signature from the source. Shielding the uranium with low
Z materials seems to be superfluous because only the neutron signal being weak.
Detection of uranium with active interrogation is the subject of the next section.
6.2 Active Interrogations
In active interrogations the associated particle detector signal is also processed in
the V1720 card. The associated particle detector covers solid angle fraction of about
1·10−4 of 4pi so that a rate of 10 kHz is expected in the operation of the neutron gen-
erator at a total intensity of 107 neutron/s. The limit is imposed by the laboratory
license.
To obtain the neutron beam spatial distribution, a vertical and horizontal scan
was performed to experimentally determine the size and central position of neutron
beam. A liquid scintillator EJ301 2”x2” was used in coincidence with YAP detector.
The profile of the beam is shown in Figure 6.8
Figure 6.8: Horizontal optimization (left panel): blu squares represent the first scan, orange di-
amonds represent the second scan after vertical optimizazion. Right panel: vertical
optimization.
In the above conditions, the spot of the tagged neutron beam produced by the
TPA17 generator at the object position, located about 30 cm from the detector box
surface, has been measured to be about 15 cm [FWHM].
In the active mode operations we stored directly all single events processed by the
V1720 card running at a typical total rate of about 50 kHz, writing the interesting
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Material Phys. St. ρ (g/cm3) H(%) C(%) N(%) O(%)
Nitroglicerine Liquid 1.6 2.2 15.9 18.5 63.4
Ammonium Nitrate Solid 1.7 5.0 0.0 35.0 58.0
Black Powder Solid 1.7-1.95 0.5 11.0 10.5 36.0
Nitrocellulose Solid 1.5-1.7 2.4 24.3 14.1 59.2
PETN Solid 1.76 2.4 19.0 17.7 60.7
TNT Solid 1.5-1.6 2.2 37.0 18.5 42.3
C-3 Solid 1.58-1.62 2.9 22.8 32.8 41.6
C-4 Solid 1.64-1.66 3.6 21.9 34.5 40.2
Comp B Solid 1.71 2.7 24.4 30.5 42.7
Tetryl Solid 1.57-1.71 1.8 29.3 24.4 44.6
Dynamite Solid 1.25 4.0 14.0 15-20 59
Trinitroanisole Solid 1.41 2.1 34.6 17.3 46.1
Trinitroxilene Solid 1.60 3.5 42.4 16.5 37.6
Table 6.2: Chemical composition of most used explosives
part of the digitized signals. Off-line software analyzes the event files reconstructing
the coincidence events and the time correlation between detectors. The time interval
from the start time of the digitalization and a given fraction of the front part of the
signal is determined for each detector, correcting for the amplitude effect. This
type of analysis yields a time resolution better than the intrinsic limit of the V1720
sampling bin (4 ns). Laboratory tests using gamma-gamma coincidences with a
22Na source and a fast plastic as trigger detectors are as follows (when the lower
threshold discrimination is set at about 500 keV):
• δt = 1.15 ns [FWHM] for LaBr3(Ce),
• δt = 5.4 ns [FWHM] for NaI(Tl).
In the active interrogation tests the two large U samples LU25 and LU44 were em-
ployed together with a 16.7 kg iron cylinder, a 6.7 kg lead bricks and a sample of
about 10 kg organic material composed by 50% of Plexiglas and 50% of melamine
powder. Typical interrogation run lasted for 10 minutes. In some cases few interro-
gation runs were performed for the same sample.
6.2.1 Chemical Sample
The use of SMANDRA for non-destructive analysis with active interrogations is
aimed primarily to the research of hazardous and / or illegal material. In most
cases these dangeours substances are composed by organic compounds with dif-
ferent chemical composition. As an example we report in table 6.2 the chemical
composition of some explosives.
From the reported data, it is clear that a non-destructive analysis system must
be able to determinate the concentration of carbon, oxygen, nitrogen and possibly
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Material Weight Dimension
Graphite (C) 3 kg Carton box (22.5 x 17 x 15.5 cm3)
Melamine (C3H6N6) 5 kg Two samples of 2.5 (11.5 x 11,5 x 20 cm
3)
Boric acid (H3BO3) 4 kg Four samples of 1 kg ( Cylinder: D 9.5 cm, H 17.5 cm)
Plexiglas (C5O2H8)n 5.2 kg Two plates of 2.6 kg (30 x 16 x 5 cm
3)
Table 6.3: Principal characteristic of the samples used during JRC test
hydrogen inside the sample. To this aim it is necessary the determination of the
characteristic γ-ray emitted by the organic nuclei under bombardment of 14MeV
neutrons. A compete review of γ-ray spectra obtained with NaI(Tl) scintillators
from most relevant organic nuclei can be found in [81].
In order to demonstrate the ability of SMANDRA to identify the presence of
nuclei C, N, O, some samples were prepared and used into JRC Laboratory where
the introduction of liquid substances is explicitly forbidden. The characteristics of
the samples used are shown in table 6.3:
The first measurement was carried out with the simplest sample: graphite. In
this case it was recorded only the time-stamp of the events and this limits the time
resolution of the system. The results for a 15 minutes run are shown in Fig. 6.9 for
the detector LaBr3(Ce) and in Fig. 6.10 for NaI(Tl).
Figure 6.9: Experimental results obtained with graphite for LaBr3(Ce) detector. In the upper
left panel coincidences reconstructed using the time-stamp. In the top right panel
energy spectra for the associated particle detector YAP:Ce. In the bottom left panel
total energy spectra for LaBr3(Ce). In the right panel energy histogram for events in
coincidence between LaBr3(Ce) and YAP:Ce.
The coincidente γ-ray spectrum (down-right panel in fig 6.9) clearly shows the
full-energy peak at 4.4 MeV and the single escape peak at 3.9 MeV due to the first
excited level of 12C. From Fig. 6.9 and 6.10 it is possible to determine the time and
energy resolution of the system. The time resolution for LaBr3(Ce) is about 9 ns
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[FWHM] (about two bins in time stamp) and the energy resolution is 2% [FWHM]
at 4.4 MeV. For NaI(Tl) we have a time resolution of 30 ns [FWHM] while the
energy resolution is 5.8% [FWHM] at 4.4 MeV. However, the presence of the carbon
is uniquely determined by the transitions at 4.4 MeV and 3.9 MeV. The yield of
the transition can provide an estimate of the amount of carbon in the voxels of the
sample using empirical calibration.
Figure 6.10: Experimental results obtained with graphite for NaI(Tl) detector. In the upper left
panel coincidences reconstructed using the time-stamp. In the top right panel energy
spectra for the associated particle detector YAP:Ce. In the bottom left panel total en-
ergy spectra for NaI(Tl). In the right panel energy histogram for events in coincidence
between NaI(Tl) and YAP:Ce.
For the other irradiated sample we report only the spectra for LaBr3(Ce) scin-
tillator that, thanks to the higher energy resolution, allows us to clearly identify the
transitions present in the coincidence energy spectra. Fig 6.11 shows the result of
melamine’s irradiation. In this case it is evident the presence of carbon and nitrogen.
In Fig. 6.12 is shown a spectrum obtained from a composite sample of plexiglass
and melamine; where the presence of oxygen transitions it is also detected.
These tests confirm the possible of verify the presence of various elements C,
N, O looking at the γ-transitions induced by 14 MeV neutrons. Regarding the
presence of hydrogen the only way to reveal it, is to search the 2.2 MeV transition
due to thermal neutron capture. Since the thermalization of neutrons in the sample
is a process of a few tens of microseconds, the signal is distributed between the
uncorrelated events in the time of flight spectra. The result of selecting a set of such
events is reported in Fig. 6.13 that shows the 2.2 MeV transitions and then the
possibility to reconstruct the presence of hydrogen in the sample.
Finally, we perform further irradiation with typical shielding material, iron and
lead. The situation in irradiating iron and lead is shown in Fig. 6.14. Moreover, the
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Figure 6.11: Experimental results obtained with melamine sample for LaBr3(Ce) detector. The
black arrows indicate the position of the Carbon peaks (4.4 and 3.9 MeV), while the
red arrows indicate the transitions attributed to nitrogen (5.1 MeV, 2.3 MeV, 0.7
MeV).
Figure 6.12: Experimental results for LaBr3(Ce) detector obtained with a mixed sample of plexiglass
and melamine. The black arrows indicate the carbon signature (4.4 and 3.9 MeV), the
red arrows indicate the nitrogen transitions (5.1 MeV, 2.3 MeV, 0.7 MeV) and the
blue arrows indicate the structures due to oxygen (6.1 and 5.7 MeV, 3.7, 3.1 and 2.7
MeV).
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Figure 6.13: Experimental results for LaBr3(Ce) detector obtained with a mixed sample of plexiglass
and melamine. The selected events are not correlated in the time of flight spectra. The
transition at 2.2 MeV is due to neutron capture in hydrogen
coincident spectra of iron exhibits the well known gamma ray transitions of inelastic
excitation (Eγ = 0.847 and 1.238 MeV) that can be used to identify easily this type
of materials [81]. The LaBr3(Ce) coincident spectrum of the lead sample shows some
structures that can be attributed to transitions in Pb isotopes as the well known
Eγ = 2.61 MeV transition in
208Pb. In this case the low statistics of the structure
implies a long measurement to have a direct identification of lead.
6.2.2 Special Nuclear Material
Typical results for U samples obtained in the interrogation with fast neutron are
reported in Fig. 6.15 for the LaBr3(Ce) scintillator in coincidence with the associated
alpha particle detector.
The spectrum of the alpha particle singles detected by the YAP:Ce scintillator is
reported in the upper right panel, while the inclusive gamma ray spectrum from the
LaBr3(Ce) is in the lower left panel, and shows the well known patter of the emission
from 238U at Eγ = 767 and 1001 keV. The time distribution of the coincidences
(upper-left panel) exhibits a double peaked structure due to the detection in the
LaBr3(Ce) of gamma rays and neutrons from the irradiated sample. Finally the
energy distribution of the gamma ray in prompt coincidence mode shows no relevant
structures that can be easily used to identify directly and in a efficient way the
uranium nuclei.
However the coincident discrete gamma ray spectra alone seems to be hardly
usable to distinguish between Pb and U when the gamma ray signature due to the
radioactive decay of uranium nuclei is not visible. Consequently we have explored
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Figure 6.14: LaBr3(Ce) gamma ray spectra in coincidence with the associated alpha particles iron
(top) and lead (bottom) samples.
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Figure 6.15: LaBr3(Ce) coincidences with the associated alpha particle detector for the LU44 sam-
ple.
Figure 6.16: Response of NE-213 detector to LU44 emission. For details on the panels see the text.
In the upper right panel, the Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD) parameter is reported
versus the scintillator pulse height. In this case PSD is the ratio between the delayed
light component and the total light, computed using the two integration gates provided
directly by the V1720 FPGA. Lines in the panel define the areas for accepted gamma
ray and neutron events.
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other signatures collected by our detection system.
The time spectrum of NE-213 shows for each sample a very narrow peak due to
prompt coincidences mainly due to neutron induced gamma rays, well separated by
a second larger peak due to secondary neutrons produced by the 14 MeV neutron
beam, as shown in Fig. 6.16 in case of irradiation of the LU44 sample. Such
secondary neutrons are associated to fission (n,f) as well as (n,xn) reactions. The
pulse height distribution both in single and coincident mode does not provide useful
information whereas the pulse-shape discrimination is used to discriminate gamma
rays and neutrons in addition to the time of flight information.
Consequently the number of the detected gamma ray and neutrons is derived
directly from the particle discrimination algorithm selecting the two types of event by
windowing the time difference between the alpha particle and the liquid scintillator
signals. This allows a very good separation between the two types of events.
Figure 6.17: Correlation between the normalized neutron and gamma ray yields measured in the
NE-213 detector: the square refers to iron, the diamond to lead, the cross to organic
and the triangles to uranium (full triangle LU44, empty triangle LU25). Data are
relative to 1 kg sample for 1 min irradiation.
The yields obtained in this way, normalized to sample weight, ratio between
the sample and the beam area and measuring time, are displayed in Fig. 6.17 in
terms of correlation between the number of gamma rays and neutrons detected in
the liquid scintillator for each sample. It is interesting to note that the relative
number of detected gamma rays and neutrons for each sample is correlated to the
relevant neutron and gamma producing cross sections for each elementary sample
(see Fig. 6.18). Data reported in Fig. 6.18 have been obtained using directly the
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relevant secondary neutron producing cross sections from the ENDF/B-IIV data
files [82] properly multiplied for the average number in the exit reaction channel.
Gamma ray producing cross section for lead and iron are obtained by summing the
production cross section for discrete gamma rays reported in [81]. Uranium data are
taken from an old Los Alamos report [83]. In evaluating the gamma ray production
cross section the effective threshold in the detector has been considered.
Figure 6.18: Correlation between neutron and gamma ray production cross-section: the square
refers to iron, the diamond to lead and the triangle to uranium.
The similarity between the experimental data of Fig. 6.17 and the cross section
estimate is striking. The difference between uranium and materials commonly used
for shielding is so large that some uncertainties in the cross section estimates seem
to be negligible.
As a conclusion, the empirical correlation displayed in Fig. 6.17 shows that,
taking into account sample mass and area, it is possible to discriminate uranium
from other materials using only the liquid scintillator data. This means that in case
of a sealed lead cask that shields the characteristic gamma ray pattern of a uranium
sample radioactive decay, the interrogation with tagged neutrons is able to provide
evidence for an anomalous emission of gamma rays and neutrons due to the presence
of uranium.
In case of the inspection of a suspect volume, as the case of cargo container, the
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tagged neutron technique allows to define a voxel inside the total volume. In this
case it is questionable that a representation as the one in Fig. 6.17 can be applied
to search for uranium. In this case new observables are required to evidence the
presence of fissile material. Assuming the case of the irradiation of a given voxel
inside a container, the gamma ray spectrum from LaBr3(Ce) easily identifies the
presence of organic or iron based material through the well known gamma lines.
In this case, in order to discriminate between lead and uranium samples for which
no discrete coincident gamma rays in the LaBr3(Ce) detector are usable, a more
accurate analysis is needed assuming that the radioactive decay pattern of U nuclei
could be shielded and therefore does not provide an alarm.
In order to obtain a discrimination plot, triple coincidences between the asso-
ciated alpha particle, the liquid scintillator and the large volume NaI(Tl) detector
were analyzed. The idea is to verify whether the multiplicity of gamma rays and
neutrons emitted in the fission of 238U yields a signature different from the Pb nuclei
where neutron multiplication is due only to (n,xn) reactions.
Typical experimental data obtained in reconstructing such triple coincidence
events are displayed in Fig. 6.19 for the uranium sample.
Figure 6.19: Triple coincidence events between the associated alpha particle, the NE-213 and the
NaI(Tl) detectors. For details see the text.
The lower panels report the time correlation between alpha particle and NE-213
(left) and alpha particle and NaI(Tl) (right) for all events in triple coincidence. A
clear peak is seen, mainly due to gamma rays, followed by a broad distribution due
to the secondary neutrons. The superior time resolution of the liquid scintillator
allows us to separate more clearly the two components. In the upper right panel is
reported the NE-213 neutron-gamma discrimination 2-D plot. In the upper left panel
is reported the 2-D time correlation between the coincidence time distributions. This
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plot is particularly interesting since it shows clearly the cross talk between the two
detectors represented by the diagonal distribution, whereas the different combination
between neutrons and gamma rays detected in both detectors are responsible for the
main structures in the 2-D plot.
To obtain a parameter which does not need a normalization, the number of
triple coincidences (YAP:Ce-NE-213-NaI(Tl)) is divided by the number of double
coincidences (YAP:Ce-NE-213). This analysis is repeated twice for gamma rays or
neutrons identified in the liquid scintillator. In Fig. 6.20 the data obtained in this
way are plotted in a 2-D representation of neutron events against gamma events for
the different samples explored in this work. The empirical representation results
in the grouping of the sample in three regions. Lead and organic material exhibit
a high probability of triple coincidence for gamma ray events (in the NE-213) but
low as far as the neutron case. The iron is characterized by a larger probability for
neutron respect to previous samples but lower for the gamma rays. The two uranium
samples have the largest probability for neutron triple events but an intermediate
value for the gamma rays respect previous samples. As a result, clear distinction
between uranium and other samples is obtained.
Figure 6.20: Double and triple coincidence results for different samples
It is worth considering that the result in Fig. 6.20 is strongly dependent on the
geometry of the present detection system. The role of the large NaI(Tl) consists
in a simple counter in coincidence with the liquid scintillator. We compare mainly
the probability that a gamma or neutron event identified in the liquid scintillator is
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accompanied by an additional gamma-ray in the NaI(Tl). We make this because of
the efficiency of the NaI(Tl) for neutrons is supposed to be lower than the one for
photons and the threshold used in active interrogation is about 500 keV. From this
point of view, the neutron events have a larger probability of being accompanied by
a gamma-ray for the uranium. It is cleary correlated to the presence of the fission
cross section.
6.2.3 Shielded Special Nuclear Material
More recently we have also studied the effect of the shielding on this type of dis-
crimination by simply using a 252Cf source to produce fission events. Results are
reported in Fig. 6.21 and are relative to the unshielded source. It seems that using
1 or 2 cm lead shielding immediately inhibits the detection of γ-ray in the NaI(Tl)
detectors thus lowering the triple/double ratio. This means that a shielded fission
source will be easily confused with other materials. A second test was performed by
replacing the NaI(Tl) with a second liquid scintillator where only neutrons are soft-
ware selected. In this case, since neutrons are scarcely attenuated by the lead, the
triples/double ratio of a fissile source remains close to that of an unshielded source.
This evidence will guide us to design a new version of the SMANDRA passive unit
able to distinguish fission sources in presence of different shielding.
Figure 6.21: Dependence of the Triples/Doubles Ratio for γ-rays and neutrons as a function of
the lead shield thickness when the NaI(Tl) detector is used to build the triple events
(squares). The triangles refer to a system in which the NaI(Tl) is replaced by a liquid
scintillator in which only neutrons are selected. The data without shield are normalized
to the (1,1) point whereas the other data points refer to 1 cm and 2 cm lead shields
Chapter 7
Demostration at the La Spezia
seaport
In July 2012 the “passive unit” of the SMANDRA system has been employed in a
field demonstration at the La Spezia seaport (Italy) together with the other partic-
ipants to the task SlimChek of the SLIMPORT project.
Figure 7.1: SMANDRA box and small robotic arm, ready for the dimonstration
The passive unit of SMANDRA is shown in Fig. 7.1. Inside the box a 12V
- 36 Ah battery is enclosed to ensure sufficient autonomy to all instrumentation
(electronic front-end and detectors). A ruggedize laptop is placed above the box and
communicates with the operative center throught WIFI connectivity. This allows
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the operator to remotely control all the functions of SMANDRA. After our system
has detected the presence of a possible threat, other components of the SlimCeck
task operated with a robot-system.
The robotic system for the management of dangerous goods in a container con-
sists of two Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV). Currently, companies Allen Van-
guard and Telerob constitute the major competitors on this market. The most
famous products are Defender and Vanguard ROVs for Allen Vanguard and Teodor
and Telemax for Telerob. These products are basically remote-control platforms,
mainly used in Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) missions. The system used by
SlimCheck leads to a significant improvement compared to the present state of the
art, providing platforms with sensors for detection of NRBC (Nuclear, radiological,
biological and chemical) threats. Another novelty of the robotic system of Slim-
Check is the remote-control anthropomorphic arm that uses haptic interface: this is
very important because allows the operator to have a feedback that can be decisive
in this kind of mission.
The ”A” robot provides access to the goods and handles the items for accurate
inspection. These operations require a considerable dexterity and a fine control of
movements and for these reason the robot is equipped with the anthropomorphic
arm with haptic interfac. However, the dangerous goods may be hidden under
heavy loads or located behind bulky objects. These problems are overcome by the
“M” robot (Handling), a forklift capable of handling large quantities of material for
opening the passage to the robot A and enable it to carry out the dangerous object.
Both robots are controlled throught WIFI network to which they also communicates
in real time the results of NBCR measurements.
The potential applications of this robot system can be extended to all cases
concerning safety, since the system in question is able to completely replace the direct
presence of an operator. Today the identification of a NRBC threat in a seaport is
assigned to the Vigili del Fuoco (Firefighter Corp), which analyze manually the goods
with a certain risk for workers. This system can ensures the operator safety, since it
replace him in the inspection, and certainly ensure the promptness of intervention,
running in a semi-automatic mode for long emergency protocols foreseen in these
cases.
The demonstration was directed to the Vigili del Fuoco and was structured in
the following way:
• the SMANDRA system was used to determine the position of a weak radioac-
tive source (about 20 kBq) located inside a shipping container and to identify
the radioactive material (Fig. 7.2),
• a remote controlled forklift opened the container and entered it to remove some
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pallets of materials around the source position (Fig. 7.3),
• the robotic arm A entered the container, catching and transporting the source
on a safety dump located outside the container (Fig. 7.4).
Fig 7.5 shows the central station. The demonstration was successfully completed.
Figure 7.2: SMANDRA determines the position of the radioactive source inside the container
Figure 7.3: Remotecontrol forklift opens the container
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Figure 7.4: The remote controlled robotic arm entered the container after removals of pallets
Figure 7.5: Operative central where all the components of SlimCeck are remote-controlled
Chapter 8
Possible applications
Liquid scintillators, like NE-213, found a rather marginal use in Homeland Secu-
rity applications since many operational contexts prohibit these liquids because of
their toxicity and flammability. Moreover liquid scintillators detect neutron above
a low energy threshold (usually few hundred keV) and exhibit a good gamma-ray
efficiency so that such detectors are normally characterized by a modest gamma-
ray rejection capability, a property that is required to identify weak neutron source
in a strong gamma-ray background [84]. It has been recently pointed out that se-
lecting the fast neutron energy region in the total neutron spectrum optimizes the
signal-to-background ratio improving the detection of weak neutron source [10]. New
liquid scintillation materials have become recently available as the EJ-309 type [85]
(from Eljen Technology) characterized by low toxicity and high flash point (144 ◦C)
compared to the more traditional EJ-301 (flash point 26 ◦C) equivalent to the well
known NE-213. The EJ-309 scintillator has been employed in pure and applied
research works confirming a PSD capability well suited to perform neutron spec-
troscopy [86][87]. The gamma rejection capability of the EJ-309 was the subject of
a recent study [88]. In next sections we will study the possible application of liq-
uid scintillator detectors in the field of Homeland Security with respect to neutron
detection in an intense gamma-ray background.
8.1 Characterization of new liquid scintillators
The detectors studied in this work consist of 2”x2” liquid scintillator cells coupled
to an H1949-51 HAMAMATSU photomultiplier (PMT) through an EJ-560 silicon
rubber interface. The PMT anode signals were directly fed into a CAEN V1720 12
bit 250 MS/s Digitizer. The PMTs operated at relatively low voltage (HV=1600
Volt) to avoid saturation effects in digitizing the pulses. The optimization of the
DPP parameters has been performed empirically by maximizing the FoM corre-
sponding to different sets of the DPP parameters. It is found that the optimized
DPP parameters for the EJ-301 and EJ-309 detectors are identical: 70 and 17 bins
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for the Long and Short Gates respectively, 10 bins for the Pre-gate and 4 bins for
the Baseline Threshold (each bin is 4 ns wide). With the above parameters, each
pulse is characterized by 70 samples and the V1720 Digitizers handles count rate up
about 100 kHz without dead time. Finally, the energy calibration of the scintillation
light was established by using the procedure described in [10] based on the fit of the
experimental pulse shape distribution by using the theoretical Compton scattering
distribution with an empirical spreading width to account for the finite detector
resolution. Samples of those spectra for a 22Na radioactive source are reported in
Fig. 8.1.
Figure 8.1: Calibrated Na22 pulse height distribution for the detectors studied in this work: EJ-301
full line, EJ-309 dashed line
It is clear from Fig. 8.1 that the spectra measured with the two scintillators
are very similar. The calibration procedure allows one to obtain an estimate of
the detector pulse height resolution by determining the spreading width needed
to reproduce the Compton Edge structures (see [62] for more details). The energy
resolution is defined as σ/L, where L is the energy value of the Compton Edge.
The energy resolution for the two liquid scintillators is equal to σ/L = 6.0% for the
Compton Edge of the 1275 keV gamma-ray (σ/L = 8.2% for the Compton Edge of
the 511 keV gamma-ray). This figure is slightly better respect to those reported in
[62] for a 2”x2” EJ-228 plastic scintillator processed with standard NIM electronics.
Finally, the low energy detection threshold, as determined from the spectra in Fig.
8.1, results to be about 60 keV.
Typical PSD versus energy scatter plots are shown in Fig. 8.2 (252Cf 0.7 ·104 n/s
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Figure 8.2: Scatter plot PSD versus energy of a 252Cf source measured with the EJ-301 detector
(upper) and EJ-309 (bottom).
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at 15 cm). In this representation the neutron and gamma regions can be separated
by a cut at PSD = 0.09 for the EJ-301 and PSD = 0.16 for the EJ-309 for energies
larger than 300 keV.
Figure 8.3: Figure-of-Merit parameter (FoM) as a function of the low energy threshold for the detec-
tors studied in this work. EJ-301 squares. EJ-309 triangles. The statistical uncertainties
are within the marker size
A number of PSD spectra have been produced and analyzed by varying the
low energy threshold. Extracted FoM values are reported in Fig. 8.3 for the two
detectors explored in this work as a function of the low energy threshold. We can
notice that the FoM increases, improving the discrimination, with the low energy
threshold reaching values FoM > 1.5 for thresholds of about 300 keV. This threshold
value corresponds to about 1.5 MeV in proton energy by using the response functions
provided in [41]. The slightly lower pulse shape capability of the EJ-309 with respect
to the EJ-301 is also confirmed, although the measured FoM values for the two
detectors are fairly closed. The FoM values measured for the EJ-301 in the present
work can be compared with the FoM = 1.6 − 1.8 for 4”x2” detectors employing
the same liquid scintillator for a threshold of 1.5 MeV proton energy [41] and FoM
= 1.61 − 1.68 for a 2”x2” BC-501A scintillator for thresholds of 0.6 and 1.0 MeV
proton energy [89].
8.1.1 Improve the γ-ray rejection capability
As discussed in details in [90], it is required that the neutron detectors employed
in Homeland Security applications shall be able to detect the presence of neutrons
inside a high gamma-ray background. As an example, for hand-held instruments the
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relevant requirements are contained in the IEC62244 standard [79]. In this case, it is
mandatory that the instrument generates a neutron alarm within 10 s sampling time
when a 10 ng unmoderated 252Cf source (equivalent to 2 ·104 neutron/s) is placed at
25 cm from the detector, which is equivalent to a distance of 15 cm for our 0.7 · 104
neutron/s source. At the same time it is generally required in Homeland Security
applications that neutron detectors shall maintain their performance in presence
of gamma radiation at a dose rate of 100µSv/h at the front face of the detection
assembly. Obviously this gamma background shall not trigger false neutron alarms.
As detailed in [90], this gamma dose rate is produced by a 137Cs source delivering
7800 photons/(s·cm2) at the front face of the detector.
Two major effects have to be considered when the detector is operated in a high
gamma-ray field:
• the possibility of fake neutron events due to physical effects as the signal pile-
up as well as instabilities of the front-end electronics at high rate that might
produce signals with a neutron-like shape,
• the tail of the gamma-ray peak towards the neutron region in the PSD spec-
trum.
EJ-301 scintillator
We start considering the number of false neutrons events produced by gamma-rays
in the EJ-301 liquid scintillators when the gamma-ray background are increased by
using 137Cs sources placed at different distances from the detector front face. After
some preliminary tests with a 400 kBq source, a first irradiation was performed
by placing a 590 MBq 137Cs source at 67 cm distance from the detector. At this
distance the dose rate at the surface of the detector is about 100µSv/h and the
detector count rate was about 50 kHz. The PSD scatter plot obtained directly by
using the FPGA parameters is reported in the left panel of Fig. 8.4. It is clear
that a large number of gamma-ray events are contaminating the neutron region. To
reduce the contamination effect it is necessary to operate a pile-up rejection [88].
Moreover, an improvement of the pulse shape discrimination was also obtained in
[91] by using a “hybrid” technique through the use of software that processes the
digitized signals.
To filter out pile-up events or look for signals that generate fake neutrons, the
digitizer operated to record the relevant part of the digitized signal in a time window
of 280 ns, which corresponds to the Long Gate integration time. On the stored data
file, a filter was applied to detect the presence of pile-up looking at multiple minima
in the digitized signal. In addition the FPGA parameters were compared event-
by-event with the same parameters derived off-line from the digitized signals. The
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Figure 8.4: PSD scatter plot from the EJ-301 scintillator irradiated with 137Cs source at the dose
rate of 100µSv/h. Left: scatter plot obtained from the FPGA processed parameters.
Center: scatter plot after the off line event filtering and Right: rejected events. Note
that simply looking at the colour code might be misleading, in fact the rejected events
represent only about 5% of the total.
filtering action resulted in the rejection of about 2% of events labelled as pile-up but
an additional 5% of the events were discarded since they did not fulfil the quality
control performed offline on the FPGA parameters. This means that some FPGA
integrations (Short or Long Gates) are not correct at this count rate. For example
some events have the correct total energy (i.e. the Long Gate integration) but not
the Short Gate integration resulting in a wrong determination of the PSD parameter.
The result of this action is shown in Fig. 8.4 where are reported the distribution
of accepted and rejected events after the filtering. It appears that the filtering
operation eliminates all spurious gamma-ray events that would end up in the wrong
region of the scatter plot. Once the event filtering strategy was established, the
252Cf source was placed at 15 cm from the detector face together with the 590 MBq
137Cs source to test the possibility of detecting the weak neutron source in a high
gamma-ray field as required in Homeland Security applications. The obtained PSD
plot of the gamma-neutron test after the filtering is reported in Fig. 8.5: we can
notice that the neutron-gamma discrimination is good enough to detect the presence
of the neutron source.
We then considered the problem related to the tail of the gamma-ray distribution
in the neutron region. This effect is shown in Fig. 8.6 where one-dimensional
PSD distributions are shown with the low energy threshold E=300 keV for different
irradiations: 252Cf source alone (top panel) 252Cf and137Cs sources with the gamma-
ray dose rate of 1 µSv/h (middle panel) and 100 µSv/h (bottom panel). In this
representation of the data the neutrons are well discriminated from the gamma-
ray even when the relative yield of the gamma-rays is increased by several order
of magnitudes. It appears that the PSD threshold for the neutron identification
needs to be slightly increased from 0.09 to 0.11 to compensate for the spill of events
from the gamma peak at larger PSD values. This means that it is rather difficult
to identify neutrons by a simple condition on the PSD parameter independent from
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Figure 8.5: PSD scatter plot after off line filtering for a weak 252Cf source in the high gamma-ray
background corresponding to 100µSv/h. The line shows the boundary for neutron-
gamma events discrimination
the gamma-ray dose rate.
Figure 8.6: Neutron-Gamma PSD distribution for a low energy threshold corresponding to 300 keV.
Left: 252Cf source; Middle: 252Cf source in a 1µSv/h gamma-ray background. Right:
252Cf source in a 100µSv/h gamma-ray background.
To optimize the neutron-gamma separation for the different gamma-ray back-
ground conditions, a polynomial function was defined, as shown in Fig. 8.5, to define
the boundary of the neutron region in the PSD scatter plot. This separation line
works good also for lower intensity gamma-ray background. The effect of the event
filtering and neutron events selection was studied in detail by looking at the neutron
counts for different conditions:
1. the laboratory room background;
2. the 252Cf source placed at 15 cm from the detector;
3. the 100µS/h irradiation with 137Cs only;
4. the irradiation as in 3 but with the 252Cf source of 2.
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Irradiation No Filter Filter
Background 0.1 0.1
252Cf at 15 cm 58 56
137Cs at 100µSv/h 6.1 · 103 0.7
137Cs at 100µSv/h and 252Cf at 15 cm 6.1 · 103 54
Table 8.1: Average neutron counts registered for 10 s time bins with the EJ-301 scintillator for
different irradiations.
The results, in terms of the average number of detected neutrons for 10 s time
bins, are reported in Table 8.1 showing the impressive effect of the software filtering:
in a high intensity gamma-ray field more than 6000 “fake” neutrons counted in 10
s are rejected allowing the detection of the 252Cf source. Moreover the software
filter does not reject true neutron events, therefore it is possible to detect a weak
neutron source in a strong gamma-ray background with an extremely good signal-
to-background ratio S/B = 54/0.7 = 77.
Finally, the false alarm rate (FAR) and the probability of detection (PD) was
determined following the prescriptions of [76] for 10 s sampling time, as required
by the standard IEC62327 for hand-held instruments [79]. Results are reported in
Table 8.2. We started with a long room background run that provided 188 sets of
data, each one characterized by 10 s sampling time. The average number of detected
neutrons was so low that the threshold for neutron alarm was set to N > 1 neutron
event. With this threshold, the probability of positive false alarm was about 0.53%
with the room background and about 5% with the high gamma-ray background.
On the contrary, the probability of alarm with the 252Cf source was 100% in both
experimental configurations. The results reported in Table 8.2 demonstrate that the
probability of detection of the 252Cf source is PD = 95% at 95% confidence level in
both cases of gamma-ray background. It is also worth noting that the false alarm
rate is strongly dependent on the alarm threshold N > 1. We recall that such low
threshold was set considering the very low counting rate of neutrons in the room
background. This value would allow us to detect extremely low intensity neutron
sources in standard natural gamma-ray background. On the other hand a slight
increase of the threshold value would result in a substantial reduction of the false
alarm rate in a strong gamma-ray background.
EJ-309 scintillator
The experimental tests described in previous section were repeated with the EJ-
309 scintillator obtaining results very close to those of EJ-301. The PSD scatter
plot obtained after software filtering for the 252Cf and 137Cs at 100µSv/h dose rate
irradiation is reported in Fig. 8.7. Here the polynomial line is used to discriminate
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Irradiation Trials Neutron alarms
Background 188 1 (0.53%)
252Cf at 15 cm 59 59 (100%)
137Cs at 100µSv/h 58 3 (5%)
137Cs at 100µSv/h and 252Cf at 15 cm 61 61 (100%)
Table 8.2: Neutron alarms with the EJ-301 scintillator in different irradiations.
Irradiation No Filter Filter
Background 1.0 0.1
252Cf at 15 cm 60 57
137Cs at 100µSv/h 5.6 · 103 1.0
137Cs at 100µSv/h and 252Cf at 15 cm 5.6 · 103 53
Table 8.3: Average neutron counts registered for 10 s time bins with the EJ-309 scintillator for
different irradiations.
gamma-ray and neutrons with EJ-309.
Figure 8.7: EJ-309 PSD scatter plot after off line filtering for a weak 252Cf source in the high
gamma-ray background corresponding to 100µSv/h. The line shows the boundary for
neutron-gamma events discrimination
It appears that a sufficiently good discrimination is obtained after software filter-
ing also using the EJ-309 scintillator. Numerical results in terms of average number
of detected neutrons for 10 s time bins are reported in Table 8.3, where it is shown
that the behaviour of the EJ-309 scintillator is substantially the same as EJ-301.
Indeed the off line software filtering the number of “fake” neutrons is almost zero so
that the detection of a 252Cf source appears to be possible also in this case.
However one should mention that EJ-309 exhibits events with an irregular sig-
nal shape giving rise to a certain number of “fake” neutrons when processed by
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Irradiation Trials Neutron alarms
Background 188 4 (2.1%)
252Cf at 15 cm 59 59 (100%)
137Cs at 100µSv/h 62 3 (4.8%)
137Cs at 100µSv/h and 252Cf at 15 cm 63 63 (100%)
Table 8.4: Neutron alarms with the EJ-309 scintillator in different irradiations.
the FPGA even at low gamma-ray intensities, typical of natural room background.
Nevertheless the software filter rejects such fake neutrons.
Finally in Table 8.4 we show results on false alarms and detection capability
related to the EJ-309 scintillator. Also in this case the threshold for the neutron
alarm is N> 1 event and the probability of positive false alarms is about FAR = 4.8%
in the high gamma-ray background. The probability of detection is PD = 95% at
95% confidence level. As a conclusion the performances of EJ-309 measured in this
work are essentially equivalent to those of EJ-301.
8.1.2 Measurements at higher dose
Additional short irradiations were also performed by changing the 590 MBq 137Cs
source-detector distance to 47 and 37 cm, which correspond to a dose rate of 200 and
300 µSv/h respectively. In such conditions, it is still possible to identify neutrons
after software filtering. In Fig. 8.8 we reported PSD scatter plots for the EJ-301
and EJ-309 scintillators irradiated by the 137Cs at 37 cm and 252Cf sources with and
without the software off-line filtering.
It is worth mentioning that in those irradiations the rejection of events was quite
high: about 4% of the events were rejected because of the pile-up filter and 10%
after the FPGA quality check. The possibility of performing PSD in such extreme
conditions is also documented in Fig. 8.9 where the PSD distributions are shown
for the two scintillators with a energy threshold of 300 keV.
8.2 Compact portable spectrometer
Looking at the possibility of using EJ-309 detector as a compact portable neutron-
gamma spectrometer, we studied the detector properties by replacing a traditional
linear focused PMT by a Flat Panel type. Such device offers several advantages with
respect to the traditional one having roughly the same cost: first of all it is extremely
compact reducing substantially the overall length of the detector. Secondly it has a
lower power requirement and, finally, it is less sensitive to magnetic fields. Thus it
seems to be well suited for portable instruments.
The detectors studied in this work consist of two cylindrical EJ-309 liquid scintil-
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Figure 8.8: PSD scatter plot before (left panel) and after (right panel) off line filtering for a weak
252Cf source in the high gamma-ray background corresponding to 300 µSv/h. Top:
EJ-301. Bottom: EJ-309.
Figure 8.9: PSD distribution for the EJ-301 (left panel) and EJ-309 (right panel) scintillators in
case of the weak 252Cf source in the high gamma-ray background (dose rate 300 µSv/h)
with a low energy threshold of 300 keV.
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Detector A Detector B
PMT H1949-51 H8500
Dimensional Outline Max Diameter 7.5 cm Area 8.5 x 8.5 cm2
Total Length 23.5 cm Total Length 2.8 cm
Total Weight 900 g 940 g
Operating Voltage -1600 V -1050 V
Divider current A 0.80 mA 0.20 mA
Table 8.5: Comparison between Detector A and B features.
lator cells 5 cm diameter by 5 cm thickness. As in previous paragraph, one cell was
coupled to an H1949-51 HAMAMATSU liner focused 12 dynodes photomultiplier
(PMT) through an EJ-560 silicon rubber interface. In the following we indicate this
detector as Detector A. A second cell was coupled by using the EJ-560 interface to
an H8500 HAMAMATSU flat panel position sensitive photomultiplier (PSPMT). In
the following we indicate this second device as Detector B. It is worth noting that
the two PMTs have a rather equivalent cost. The PSPMT is characterized by a
square active area of about 5x5 cm2 divided in 64 independent anodes (pixels). In
our application all anodes outputs were properly connected together, consequently
the use of the PSPMT is perfectly equivalent to the PMT: a single HV channel and
a single anode signal.
Table 8.5 compares the major technical features of the two PMTs relevant for
the present application. The two major advantages in using the PSPMT are clearly
evident: size reduction of the device and lower power requirement. In the present
work the detector anode signals are directly fed into a CAEN DT5751 10 bit 1 GS/s
Digitizer. The detectors are operated at HV= 1600 Volt and HV= 1050 V for the
H1949-51 and H8500 MPTs respectively, to avoid saturation effects in digitizing the
pulses. Inside the DT5751 card, Digital Pulse Processing (DPP) algorithms are
implemented using FPGA as described in Section 4.5.
The energy calibration of the scintillation light was established by the procedure
described in [62]. Samples of gamma ray energy spectra obtained with a 22Na
radioactive source are reported in Fig. 8.10. It is immediately evident that the
spectra measured with the two detectors exhibits a similar energy resolution as
deduced from the width of the Compton Edge for the 511 keV gamma ray. The
energy resolution derived in this case is 5.0%, 4.7% for the 1275 keV gamma-ray,
8.8% and 8.2% for the 511 keV gamma-ray for detector A and B respectively. Finally,
the low energy detection threshold, as determined from the spectra in Fig. 8.10,
results to be below 50 keV. It is interesting to note that the slightly better energy
resolution obtained with the H8500 PSPMT is most probably related to the larger
photo-cathode quantum efficiency (> 20%) in the range 300-400 nm, compared to
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Figure 8.10: Calibrated gamma ray energy spectra obtained with a 22Na source. Detector A left
panel. Detector B right panel
that of the H1949-51 assembly (< 20%) in the same wavelength range.
The pulse shape discrimination (PSD) of the two detectors was studied as in
previous paragraph 8.1. Typical PSD versus energy scatter plots are shown in figure
8.11.
Figure 8.11: Pulse Shape Discrimination scatter plots: PSD versus energy. Left panel Detector A.
Right panel Detector B
PSD spectra reported in figure 8.12 have been produced setting 300 keV low
energy thresholds. Extracted FoM values are 1.67 and 1.66 for the Detectors A and
B respectively, showing no difference
8.2.1 Operation in magnetic field
The detectors have been tested when operated in a magnetic field. Gamma ray
spectra from a 22Na source were measured with the detectors positioned in proximity
of a dipolar electromagnet. The magnetic field value at the detector position was
measured by a Hall probe (LABORATORIO ELETTROFISICO model DG4080
with a Hall probe FW BELL model STD 58-0404). The spectra measured with
detector A and B for different magnetic field values are reported in Fig. 8.13 and
8.14, respectively.
As reported in Fig. 8.13, the gain of the photomultiplier for detector A decreases
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Figure 8.12: Pulse Shape spectra for 300 keV low energy threshold. Left panel Detector A. Right
panel Detector B.
Figure 8.13: Pulse height distributions measure for different magnetic field values for detector A.
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Figure 8.14: Pulse height distributions measure for different magnetic field values for detector B.
as the magnetic field increasing, with a corresponding deterioration of the energy
resolution. As an example, the pulse height corresponding to the 1275 keV Compton
Edge is reduced by about 70-80 % at 60 Gauss, with a reduction of energy resolution
from 5% to 11%. The behaviour of detector B is rather different, as documented
in Fig. 8.14. In this case the reduction of the Compton Edge position is within
20% when the field is about 250 Gauss with a correlated deterioration of energy
resolution of the same order. This effect is certainly related to the larger distance
between adjacent dynodes in the linear focused PMT, while in the Flat Panel design
the dynode structure is more compact. As a result, the magnetic deflection of
electrons with consequent loss of signal, caused the lowering of the final gain.
8.2.2 Time resolution
Specific test was performed to compare the time resolution achievable with detectors
A and B. It is well known that the intrinsic rise time of the H8500 PSPMT single
anode signal is better than the H1949-51 PMT one. However there is a small variable
delay among the different anodes that needs to be taken into account when measuring
time-of-flight [92]. As an example, the distribution of the relative delay with respect
to one anode taken as reference is reported in Fig. 8.15. It seems that the average
relative delay is about 500 ps with a width of about 500 ps [FWHM]. The latter
does certainly contribute to the overall time resolution of a H8500 PMT when all
anodes are read together as in the present application.
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Figure 8.15: Relative distribution of the anode delays of a H8500 PMT
Experimental tests were performed by measuring gamma-gamma coincidences
with a 22Na source using a fast plastic (EJ-228 2”x2” coupled with a XP2020 PMT)
as reference detector. The contribution to the overall measured time resolution of
the fast plastic was experimentally determined by running two of such detectors in
coincidence. Experimental data were acquired by the DT5751 digitizer. Experimen-
tal results are reported in Fig. 8.16 where the time resolution of single detectors
(fast plastic EJ-228, detector A and detector B) are reported as a function of the
energy threshold in the virtual CFTD. It appears that clustering the anodes of the
H8500 PSPMT to provide a single timing signal deteriorates the achievable time
resolution compared to the linear focus PMT. This can be explained by the delay
distribution of the pixels (reported in Fig. 8.15) as well as additional delay due to
the anodes connecting lines. However, it is worth mentioning that a sub-nanosecond
time resolution is obtained even with a 100 keV low-energy threshold, well within
the requirements of several applications.
8.2.3 Propotype
A first prototype of a compact spectrometer realized with new EJ-309 liquid scin-
tillator coupled with H8500 Flat Panel is shown in Fig. 8.17.
The main characteristics are compactness, light weight, low power consumption,
battery operated, usable within a weak magnetic field and controlled with small dig-
ital electronics. The total weight of the present prototype (including the computer)
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Figure 8.16: Time resolution of a single scintillation detector as measured with a 22Na source as a
function of the virtual CFTD energy threshold. Circles, squares and diamonds refer
to the reference fast plastic detector: Detector A and Detector B, respectively
Figure 8.17: Prototype of battery operated neutron gamma spectrometer
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is about 8.9 kg with a battery granting a working time of about 2.5 h. The proto-
type is currently under laboratory characterization. The efficiency of the detector
for neutron and gamma rays complies with the requirements of IEC standards [79].
Moreover, software is under development to identify the radioactive sources using
the relevant features of the spectra. First results show that the prototype satisfies
IEC requirements for determining the presence of gamma ray sources in addition to
the natural background as well as for isotope identification. The neutron detection
capability of the system will open the possibility of detecting the presence of a weak
neutron source as well as to get information about the neutron energy from the pulse
shape distribution. First applications of the spectrometer are envisaged in the field
of plasma physics and fusion research and engineering.
Chapter 9
Summary and conclusions
9.1 Detector performances
All the detector used in SMANDRA system have been fully characterized. Initial
tests were done with traditional analog NIM electronics followed by the new digital
electronics based on fast digitizers. Concerning the high efficiency detector for γ-ray
(5”x5” NaI(Tl)), it was found an energy resolution of 7.7% for the 511 keV full energy
peak with analog electronic comparable with values reported in literature [25]. A
significant improvement of the measured energy resolution is obtained using digital
electronic (fast digitizer CAEN V1720), in particularly at lower energy where the
resolution for the 511 keV peak decreases to 7.0%. The detector maintains a good
energy linearity in all the energy range investigated with active interrogation between
few keV up to 8 MeV.
The energy resolution of a LaBr3(Ce) scintillation detector improves by using
the V1720 resepect to the resolution obtained with the same detector equipped with
standard NIM shaping amplifiers up to 20 kHz. The values decrease from 3.5% at 511
keV with NIM electronics to 3.2% for fast digitizers. Saint-Gobain guarantees, for
this detector, resolution better than 3.5% on 137Cs peak at 662 keV. With the same
source we measured a resolution of 3.12%, 11% better than nominal value. Further
study has been performed to check the performances up to very high counting rate by
using a 12bit 250 MS/s CAEN V1720 digitizer. Despite a slight deterioration at high
rate, the energy resolution is generally better than the measured one using standard
NIM electronics and is generally lower than the value declared by Saint-Gobain up
to very high rates (i.e. 340 kHz). Instead LaBr3(Ce) detector reveals a non-linearity
in energy calibration for the largest pulse heights. Such effect is evident over 2 MeV
and it is due to saturations of the PMT. In our case, this non-linearity has been
compensated by using an additional quadratic term into the energy calibration. This
procedure is necessary in active interrogations when photons in the range 2-7 MeV
are of primary interest.
The time resolution was obtained processing off line the digitized signals in a
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gamma-gamma experiment against a fast plastic scintillator. For LaBr3(Ce) detector
the time resolution is about δt = 1.2 ns [FWHM] to be compared with δt = 0.65
ns [FWHM] when standard NIM Constant Fraction Time Discriminators are used.
However the time resolution by using the V1720 digitizer is enought for the present
application. Indeed results presented in section 4.8 demonstrate the possibility to
get the following time resolution:
• 1 ns for fast detectors, i.e. LaBr3(Ce) and NE-213 liquid scintillator,
• 5 ns in the case of NaI(Tl) detector with a threshold of 500 keV.
These values are compatibile with SMANDRA requirements for NDA with tagged
neutrons. We noticed that 5 ns correspond to 25 cm of flight distance for 14 MeV
neutrons, and this would be the effective space resolution of the system using NaI(Tl)
scintillator; with other two detectors the resolution would be smaller than 10 cm.
The performaces of NE-213 liquid scintillator were optimized as a function of
the FoM parameter. Better performances were obtained with digital electronics
respect to the classic NIM chain. The FoM parameter for NE-213, computed in an
energy range of 400-1400 keVee, is 1.08 and 0.90 for digital and analog electronics
respectively. This value ensures a good discrimination capability between neutron
and γ-ray that allows the identification of neutrons as required from standards.
Specific tests were performed at high rates to check the discrimination capability in
presence of a intense γ-ray sources. The result shows a worsening of the FOM at
high rate (35 kHz) of about 20% for NE-213 detector due mainly to signal pileup
and electronic instabilites. Further tests performed with new detectors demonstrate
the possibility to maintain the discrimination capability up to several hundred of
kHz (300 kHz). This is due to better performance of new liquid scintillator and to
the development of the FPGA firmware in which are now implemented a quality
check on the FPGA output and a filter for pileup rejection.
9.2 Project goals
The detection and identification of standard radioactive sources (gamma ray and
neutrons) has been tested successfully showing detection probability in order or
even better with the requirements of this type of instrumentation.
The detection of special nuclear material has been tested with the mobile SMAN-
DRA inspection system both as a high sensitivity passive spectroscopic system and
as a complete active inspection system using tagged neutrons. The detection of
plutonium samples seems to be possible with passive interrogation even in case of
small samples (few grams) due to the yield of gamma ray and neutrons.
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As it is well known, detection of uranium samples poses more problems because
of the low neutron yield that characterizes this material. The gamma ray yield of
highly enriched U samples could be easily shielded. In this case active interrogation
is needed. Results of our work show that the SMANDRA inspection system is able to
provide signature for the discrimination of uranium against heavy metals (as lead) by
looking to the absolute gamma and neutron yield in coincidence with tagged neutrons
or to correlations between detectors. It is worth mentioning that the SMANDRA
system is a mobile multi-purpose spectrometric system not specifically designed to
detect SNM. However the results reported might be implemented in future portable
systems specifically designed to detect SNM in active mode. Some further results
obtained with small detector cells are reported in Sec. 8 demonstrating some follow-
up application of the SMANDRA know-how.
9.3 Publications
The publications concerning the SMANDRA system:
• D. Cester, D. Fabris, M. Lunardon, S. Moretto, G. Nebbia, S. Pesente, L.
Stevanato, G. Viesti. An integrated mobile system for port security. ANIMMA
Conf. Proc. 2011.
• D. Cester, G. Nebbia, L. Stevanato, G Viesti, F. Neri, S. Petrucci, S. Selmi,
C. Tintori, P. Peerani, A. Tomani. Special nuclear material detection with a
mobile multi-detector system. Nucl. Instr. and Meth. Section A, Volume
663, Issue 1, 21 January 2012, Pages 5563.
• D. Cester, G. Nebbia, L. Stevanato, G Viesti, F. Neri, S. Petrucci, S. Selmi,
C. Tintori, P. Peerani, A. Tomani. Special Nuclear material detection with a
mobile multi-detector system. AIP Conf. Proc. 1423, Pages 335-340, 2012.
• D. Cester, G. Nebbia, L. Stevanato, G. Viesti, F. Neri, S. Petrucci, S. Selmi,
C. Tintori. High rate read-out of LaBr3(Ce) scintillator with the CAEN V1720
FADC. AIP Conf. Proc. 1423, Pages 441-445, 2012.
• Stevanato et al. High rate read-out of LaBr3(Ce) scintillator with a fast dig-
itizer. Nucl. Instr. and Meth. Section A, Volume 678, 21 June 2012, Pages
8387.
• Stevanato et al. Neutron detection in a high gamma-ray background with EJ-
301 and EJ-309 liquid scintillators. Nucl. Instr. and Meth. Section A,
Volume 690, 21 October 2012, Pages 96-101.
Conference presentation:
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• IEEE (NSS-MIC) 2011 - Nuclear Science Symposium, Medical Imaging Con-
ference. An integrated mobile system for port security , 22-29 Ottobre 2011,
Valencia, Spagna.
• CAARI 2012 - 22st International Conference on the Application of Accelerators
in Research and Industry. Neutron detection in a high gamma ray background
with liquid scintillators, 5-10 Agosto 2012, Forth Worth (TX), USA.
Finally, the work performed with the SMANDRA system has been the seed for an
Italian Patent “Metodo per il riconoscimento di sorgenti radiattive” (PD2011A000236
12 July 2011) under request of the Padova University, inventors G. Viesti, G. Neb-
bia, L. Stevanato and D. Cester. The matter of the patent is not presented in this
thesis work.
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